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Three Supreme Court “Failures” 
and a Story of Supreme Court Success 
Corinna Barrett Lain* 
Plessy v. Ferguson. Buck v. Bell. Korematsu v. United States. 
Together, these three decisions legitimated ‘separate but equal,’ sanctioned the 
forced sterilization of thousands, and ratified the removal of Japanese 
Americans from their homes during World War II. By Erwin Chemerinsky’s 
measure in The Case Against the Supreme Court, all three are Supreme 
Court failures—cases in which the Court should have protected vulnerable 
minorities, but failed to do so. Considered in historical context, however, a 
dramatically different impression of these cases, and the Supreme Court that 
decided them, emerges. In two of the cases—Plessy and Buck—the Court’s 
ruling reflected the progressive view at the time, and in the third—
Korematsu—the extralegal context of the case was strong enough to draw the 
support of Justices Black and Douglas, two of the Court’s most staunch civil 
liberties defenders. Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu are potent reminders of the 
need to historically situate the Supreme Court when evaluating its proclivity 
to protect. But this is not to say that an ahistoric view of the Court’s protective 
capacity is all bad. However historically inaccurate, the Supreme Court’s 
image as a countermajoritarian protector also has a curious upside, setting in 
motion forces that can, over time, enable and inspire the Court’s protection. In 
the end, our expectations of the Supreme Court as a countermajoritarian hero 
both give rise to a rhetoric of failure and pave the way for future protection. 
What is vastly underappreciated is the connection between the two—how 
within the rhetoric of failure lies a larger, and largely untold, story of 
Supreme Court success. 
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Lombardo, Shari Motro, Abigail Perdue, Wendy Perdue, Allison Tait, Mary Kelly Tate, and 
Adrian Vermeule for comments on earlier drafts, and to Dan Hogan, Zack McDonald, and Holly 
Wilson for their excellent research assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he Supreme Court is not the institution that I once 
revered,” writes Erwin Chemerinsky in The Case Against the Supreme 
Court—a provocative, important work that also happens to be a great 
read.1 Chemerinsky’s claim is that the Supreme Court ought to be 
protecting vulnerable minorities from repressive majorities, but it has 
not done so.2 “The Court has frequently failed, throughout American 
history, at its most important tasks, at its most important moments,” 
he argues.3 This is Chemerinsky’s case against the Supreme Court, 
and it is a sweeping indictment. 
Of the cases Chemerinsky cites to prove his point, three stand 
out as particularly strong examples of the Supreme Court’s failure to 
protect: Plessy v. Ferguson,4 Buck v. Bell,5 and Korematsu v. United 
States.6 Plessy is the 1896 decision that upheld ‘separate but equal’ 
 
 1. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 5 (2014). 
 2. Id. at 10: 
I believe that the two preeminent purposes of the Court are to protect the rights of 
minorities who cannot rely on the political process and to uphold the Constitution in 
the face of any repressive desires of political majorities. . . . My thesis, developed in 
the chapters of this book, is that the Court has largely failed at both of these tasks. 
For an argument that the very fact of Chemerinsky’s claim is evidence of a larger story of 
Supreme Court success, see infra Part III.C. 
 3. Id. at 5.   
 4.  163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 5.  274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 6.  323 U.S. 214 (1944). I passed by Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) 
(holding that African Americans, whether enslaved or free, could not be citizens and that 
Congress lacked the power to ban slavery in U.S. territories), for the same reason that others 
have left it off the Supreme Court’s “worst of the worst” list. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF 
THE PEOPLE 372 (2009) (“Many today would pick Dred Scott as the Court’s greatest gaffe, but at 
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racial classifications.7 Buck is the 1927 decision that upheld 
involuntary sterilization of the hereditarily “feebleminded.”8 And 
Korematsu is the 1944 decision that upheld the removal of Japanese 
Americans from their homes during World War II.9 All three make the 
short list of most maligned cases in Supreme Court history, cases 
uniformly condemned as moral failures, or at least instances in which 
the Court let us down.10 Indeed, Plessy and Korematsu are considered 
so odious that they have earned the dubious distinction of 
“anticanon,”11 and Buck is considered so grossly misguided that 
Chemerinsky chose it as the opening vignette of his book.12 By 
Chemerinsky’s measure, all three are compelling examples of 
Supreme Court failures—cases in which the Court should have 
protected vulnerable minorities, but failed to do so.   
Considered in historical context, however, a dramatically 
different impression of these cases, and the Supreme Court that 
decided them, comes into view. In two of the three cases—Plessy and 
Buck—the Court’s decision reflected the progressive view at the time, 
and in the third—Korematsu—the historical context was strong 
enough to draw the support of Justices Douglas and Black, two of the 
Court’s most staunch civil liberties defenders.  In all three cases, 
reconstructing the historical context in which the Justices were 
operating leads to an important insight: it would have been wildly 
 
least in that case the justices thought they were standing up for minority rights, albeit the 
property rights of slaveholders.”); see also MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 1, 4 (2006) (“My claim is that the result in Dred Scott v. Sanford may have 
been constitutionally correct. . . . Careful historical analysis belies the standard institutional, 
historical, and aspirational criticisms of that decision.”). 
 7.  See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550–51.  
 8.  See Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. 
 9.  See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 224. 
 10.  See ADAM COHEN, IMBECILES 9–10 (2016) (discussing “the Supreme Court’s worst 
decisions” and naming Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu as three of the five cases on that list); 
Suzanna Sherry, Why We Need More Judicial Activism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, EXECUTIVE 
POWER, AND THE SPIRIT OF MODERATION (Giorgi Areshidze, Paul Carrese, & Suzanna Sherry 
eds., forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2213372 [https://perma.cc/3DJF-NEDS] (listing 
Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu as three of history’s six most universally condemned Supreme 
Court decisions); Symposium, Supreme Mistakes, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 1–11 (2011) (discussing 
symposium on the “most maligned decisions in Supreme Court history,” with three of the five 
contributions focusing on Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu); see also infra note 71 (placing Buck 
alongside “low points in Supreme Court history” like Plessy and Korematsu). 
 11.  Cases that constitute “anticanon” are so antithetical to our social order that they stand 
for “a set of propositions that all legitimate constitutional decisions must be prepared to refute.” 
Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 383 (2011) (defining “anticanon” and 
identifying Plessy and Korematsu as two of four Supreme Court decisions that meet that 
definition). 
 12.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 1–5. 
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hubristic, to the point of being almost unfathomable, for the Supreme 
Court in any of these cases to have ruled the other way. 
Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu are worthy as case studies not 
because they show how the Supreme Court has failed us, but rather 
because they show how historical context can constrain the Justices’ 
proclivity to protect.  The Justices do not interpret the Constitution in 
a vacuum, let alone in a time capsule with the sensibilities of future 
years. They decide cases in a particular historical moment, and as 
such, are subject to the panoply of attitudes, assumptions—even 
prejudices—that define that moment in time.13 When the paradigm in 
which the Justices operate is racist, the Justices are likely to be racist. 
And when it is awash with support for civil liberties, there is a good 
chance the Justices will be too. What was true fifty years ago still 
holds true today: “The more widely held the values in society, the 
more likely the Supreme Court will hold them.”14 
In prior work, I have endeavored to make this point by 
examining cases in which the Supreme Court ostensibly played the 
role of the countermajoritarian hero, protector of minorities from 
oppressive majority rule. On such highly controversial issues as 
capital punishment, abortion, and school prayer, I have historically 
situated the Court’s protection to show that it was a response to, and 
reflection of, larger sociopolitical change.15  Here I turn my attention 
from the Court-as-hero to the Court-as-failure with the aim of showing 
that the flip side is also true—just as extralegal context can inspire 
the Supreme Court to protect, it can also limit its inclination to do so. 
Culture can both empower and constrain,16 and that is a problem for 
The Case Against the Supreme Court. Chemerinsky wants the 
Supreme Court to protect vulnerable minorities, but history shows 
 
 13.  See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921) (“The 
great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass 
the judges by.”). For Justice Holmes’ articulation of the point, see infra note 146. 
 14.  George D. Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YALE L.J. 571, 
594 (1948). 
 15.  See Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 19–45 (2007) 
(discussing larger sociopolitical context of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), invalidating 
the death penalty as then administered); Corinna Barrett Lain, God, Civic Virtue, and the 
American Way: Reconstructing Engel, 67 STAN. L. REV. 479, 489–506 (2015) (discussing the 
larger sociopolitical context of Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), invalidating school prayer); 
Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113, 133–44 (2012) 
(discussing the larger sociopolitical context of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), recognizing a 
right to privacy in the context of abortion). 
 16.  See Edward L. Rubin, The Supreme Court in Context: Conceptual, Pragmatic and 
Institutional, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1115, 1117 (2016) (“Real-world decision-makers necessarily 
function in political, economic, and social settings, and those settings both empower and 
constrain them.”). 
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that when minorities are most vulnerable—when society is itself 
repressive—the Justices are least likely to see the need to protect. 
Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu illustrate the point in three 
slightly different ways. Plessy shows how culture can limit the realm 
of plausible constitutional outcomes that a majority of the Justices 
might find agreeable. Buck shows how strong the gravitational pull of 
public opinion can be. And Korematsu shows how gusts of public 
passion can overtake the sensibilities of even those Justices most 
receptive to civil liberties claims. Three illustrations, one overarching 
point: the Supreme Court’s proclivity to protect is in part a function of 
the historical context in which it is operating, and that limits what the 
Court can realistically do. 
Three clarifications merit mention.  First, this is not to say that 
cases like Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu should not be criticized. 
Condemning cases from the past for the value judgments they 
represent can help bring clarity to our value judgments going forward, 
whether or not the Justices could have decided those cases differently 
at the time.17 Indeed, the specter of our past may foment heightened 
sensitivity to minority rights in the future.18 But condemning obsolete 
values is different from condemning the Supreme Court as a failure 
because of them. The Court cannot escape the historical context in 
which it operates; it cannot transcend the mores of the society in 
which the Justices live. In short, the point is not that Plessy, Buck, 
and Korematsu aren’t lamentable—they are.19 The point is that these 
lamentable cases were decided in lamentable times. 
Second, this is not to say that the Justices’ decisionmaking is 
historically predetermined. Sometimes historical context plays a 
determinative role in the Justices’ decisionmaking, a point I aim to 
make with the case studies of Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu below. But 
what is true of those cases may not be true of others. Culture limits 
 
 17.  As Jamal Greene put the point, “We are what we are not.” Greene, supra note 11, at 
381. 
 18.  For example, Korematsu played this role in the wake of 9/11. See Roger Daniels, The 
Japanese American Cases, 1942-2004: A Social History, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 170 
(2005):  
A striking difference is that although almost no public figures spoke out against the 
massive violations of the rights of citizens in 1942, the aftermath of 9/11 produced 
much public criticism of significantly lesser governmental violation of rights. And the 
analogy with the Japanese American experience was raised so often that it seems 
obvious that an increased awareness of its gross injustice was a factor in the 
heightened sensitivity within and without the government.  
 19.   They are lamentable in the way that Aaron-Andrew Bruhl has recognized—as “old 
decisions emblematic of shameful social practices that, looking back, we wish someone had 
stopped.” Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Judicial Activism and the Problem of Induction, 16 GREEN 
BAG 2D 453, 454 (2013). 
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the Supreme Court’s proclivity to protect and therefore limits what it 
can realistically do, but within the realm of what is realistically 
possible, a number of other factors influencing the Justices’ 
decisionmaking are also in play.20 
Finally, this is not to say that an ahistoric view of the Supreme 
Court is all bad. Mostly it is—particularly for constitutional theory, 
which has been widely criticized for its inability to justify judicial 
review based on a realistic conception of how the Supreme Court 
operates.21 But an ahistoric, overinflated view of the Court’s protective 
capacity has a curious upside as well. However historically inaccurate, 
the Supreme Court’s image as a countermajoritarian hero ready and 
able to transcend its cultural constraints has set in motion forces that 
can, over time, ease those constraints and inspire the Court’s 
protection. More remarkable yet is the Supreme Court’s role in 
creating this image in the first place. With the Court as creator of the 
very expectations by which it is judged a failure, the fact of 
Chemerinsky’s disappointment in the Supreme Court is itself a 
testament to a larger, and largely untold, story of Supreme Court 
success. 
In this symposium contribution inspired by, and in response to, 
The Case Against the Supreme Court, I use Plessy, Buck, and 
Korematsu as case studies to show how historical context can 
constrain the Supreme Court’s inclination to protect, limiting what the 
Court can realistically do. Part I places Plessy in its larger historical 
context, Part II turns to Buck, and Part III considers Korematsu. In 
Part IV, I discuss what we can learn from these historically 
reconstructed cases. I start with the recognition that historical context 
matters, nuancing the point by considering culture alongside other 
influences on Supreme Court decisionmaking. I then turn to three 
ways that culture can constrain the Justices’ proclivity to protect, 
using Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu as illustrations. I close with a 
discussion of where, given the Court’s inability to transcend its 
cultural constraints, the image of the Supreme Court as a 
countermajoritarian protector came from, and locate its origin in the 
Supreme Court itself.  In numerous ways, I argue, the very notion of 
Supreme Court “failures” is itself evidence of a larger story of 
Supreme Court success. 
 
 20.  For a more detailed discussion of the point, see infra notes 243–249 and accompanying 
text.  
 21.  For a more detailed discussion of the point, see infra notes 240–241 and accompanying 
text. 
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I. PLESSY V. FERGUSON 
Chemerinsky describes the Supreme Court’s 1896 decision in 
Plessy v. Ferguson22 as one of “the most tragically misguided Supreme 
Court decisions in American history.”23 In Plessy, the Supreme Court 
upheld “equal but separate” accommodations for African American 
railway passengers, legitimizing racial classifications for the next 
sixty years.24  Today, Plessy is considered so wrongly decided that its 
chief utility has become its status as a point of law for others to 
criticize.25 
Chemerinsky acknowledges that the Justices in Plessy lived in 
a segregated society in which racism was deeply embedded, limiting 
what the Supreme Court could do.26 But he argues that the Justices 
“did not need to uphold ‘separate but equal’ in Plessy. It is quite 
justifiable to have expected the Court to do better.”27 After all, he 
writes, “There is no reason that a majority of the Justices could not 
have accepted Justice Harlan’s reasoning in Plessy.”28 Justice Harlan 
dissented, the argument goes, so the other Justices could have, and 
should have, seen the injustice too. 
Why Justice Harlan voted as he did in Plessy is a question I set 
aside for the moment and return to below.29 First, however, I provide a 
more robust historical perspective of the case than a mere 
acknowledgement that society was segregated allows. Without that 
perspective, it is easy to condemn the Justices in Plessy. With it, 
Chemerinsky’s claim that the Supreme Court could have, and should 
have, done better becomes exceedingly difficult to make. 
 
 22.  163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 23.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 37; see also Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 25 (1996) (“It is fair to say that Plessy is 
generally vilified today as one of the two most egregious decisions in Supreme Court history 
(along with Dred Scott).”).   
 24.  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550–51; Sherry, supra note 10, at 15 (“Plessy allowed Jim Crow laws 
to deepen, racism to become more entrenched, and the status of African Americans to deteriorate 
for almost 60 years.”).  
 25.  That is what makes it anticanon. See Greene, supra note 11, at 386 (“[Anticanon are 
cases] so wrongly decided that their errors . . . we would not willingly let die. It remains 
important for us to teach, to cite, and to discuss these decisions, ostensibly as examples of how 
not to adjudicate constitutional cases.”). 
 26.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 30 (“To be fair, there is plenty of blame to go 
around, and racism was deeply embedded in the country, limiting what any court could do.”); id. 
at 293 (“The justices who approved ‘separate but equal’ in Plessy lived in a society that was 
racially segregated.”). 
 27.  Id. at 337. 
 28.  Id. at 38. 
 29.  See infra notes 59–65 and accompanying text (discussing possible reasons for Justice 
Harlan’s dissent).   
         
1026 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:4:1019 
The story starts not with the fall of Reconstruction in the mid-
1870s (as frequently told), but rather in the late 1880s and early 
1890s, when race relations in the South took a sharp turn for the 
worse.30 Black lynchings soared, tripling what they had been just a 
decade earlier and hitting historic highs in 1892.31 States adopted 
legal measures to formalize the disenfranchisement of blacks already 
occurring through threats of violence.32 And state-mandated 
segregation replaced extensive de facto segregation on railways and 
other means of mass transport.33 Indeed, the Louisiana law at issue in 
Plessy was one of nine state statutes passed between 1887 and 1892 
that imposed de jure segregation on railways.34 In light of the spike in 
violence towards blacks at the time, de jure segregation was widely 
justified as “enlightened public policy”—a distinctly progressive 
response to interracial conflict—although it was racist through and 
through.35 
A number of forces drove these developments, exacerbating 
racism throughout the country: the migration of blacks to the North, 
increasing racial anxiety there;36 the growing political power of poor 
white farmers in the South, intensifying demands for white 
 
 30.  See CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 8 
(1987) (noting that draconian racist measures associated with end of reconstruction in 1870s 
actually occurred from the late 1880s to 1900); Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. 
CT. REV. 303, 309 (discussing “long downward spiral” in race relations by late 1880s). 
 31.  See Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
881, 888–89 (1998) (noting “a dramatic deterioration of southern race relations during the 1890s” 
and that “the annual number of black lynchings rose dramatically, peaking early in the decade”). 
In 1882, 49 African Americans were lynched.  In 1892, that number was 161. See Lynchings: By 
Year and Race, UMKC, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/ lynchingyear.html 
(last visited May 11, 2016) [https://perma.cc/CTP5-FD3W]. 
 32.  See Klarman, supra note 31, at 889 (“[S]outhern states adopted formal measures such 
as poll taxes, literacy tests, and residency requirements to supplement the de facto 
disfranchisement of blacks already accomplished through violence and fraud by the late 1880s.”). 
 33.  See LOFGREN, supra note 30, at 7–27 (discussing the move from de facto to de jure 
segregation of public transportation in the late 1880s and 1890s). 
 34.  See id. at 22 (listing states).  
 35.  ALFRED HOLT STONE, STUDIES IN THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM 64 (1908) (“As a 
matter of fact, such legislation is the embodiment of enlightened public policy, and is the surest 
guarantee of a minimum amount of friction between the races.”); see also Klarman, supra note 
30, at 387 (“The Court acquiesced in railroad segregation at a time when deteriorating southern 
race relations convinced many southern blacks of the futility of protesting such practices, and 
racial violence and lynching made segregation increasingly appear to be reasonably progressive 
policy.”).  
 36.  See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 12 (2004) (discussing larger phenomenon and noting that 
“[t]he growing numbers of blacks in the North led to discrimination in public accommodations, 
occasional efforts to segregate public schools, increased lynchings, and deteriorating racial 
attitudes.”). 
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supremacy as a means of elevating their precarious social status;37 the 
immigration of millions of Southern and Eastern Europeans in the 
1880s and ‘90s, triggering racial nativism in the Northeast and 
newfound sympathy for the South’s position on race;38 a growing 
desire for sectional reconciliation, providing yet another reason to 
defer to the South on race;39 the Republican Party’s solidification of 
power in the early to mid-1890s, reducing its reliance on the Southern 
black vote and its commitment to the protection of black rights;40 a 
new generation of Southern blacks unschooled in the strictures of 
racial etiquette under slavery;41 and for railways in particular, the 
growing importance of interstate travel and the attendant need for 
social control.42 
Taken together, these forces created a landscape where white 
supremacy was so entrenched that it was, as one historian put the 
point, “beyond critical reach in the late nineteenth century.”43 The 
public discourse at the time was filled with declarations of the 
inferiority of African Americans—their intellect, their moral code, 
 
 37.  See id. at 11 (discussing larger phenomenon and noting that “[t]he growing political 
power of poor white farmers, whose precarious economic and social status inclined them to 
treasure white supremacy, did not bode well for blacks”). 
 38.  See id. at 12 (discussing larger phenomenon and noting that “Northerners concerned 
about the dilution of ‘Anglo-Saxon racial stock’ by Italian Catholics and Russian Jews were 
attracted to southern racial policies.”). 
 39.  See id. at 13 (discussing larger phenomenon and noting that “[t]he pace of sectional 
reconciliation accelerated in the 1890s, as northerners acquiesced in southern racial ‘home 
rule.’ ”).  
 40.  See id. at 14–15 (discussing larger phenomenon and noting that Republican Party wins 
in 1894 and 1896 allowed it to “maintain national control without southern electoral support, 
thus removing an important incentive to defend black suffrage in the South”). 
 41.  See LOFGREN, supra note 30, at 25: 
But the most direct trigger for the initial wave of Jim Crow legislation was increasing 
black unwillingness to defer to whites. A new generation, raised outside the confines 
of slavery and the web of antebellum restrictions on free blacks, was coming of age. 
Negro newspapers perceived growing black assertiveness in the face of indignities 
inflicted by whites; and among the white population, stories of ‘uppity’ Negroes 
increased during the 1880s. 
See also KLARMAN, supra note 36, at 18 (discussing larger phenomenon and noting that 
“[a]nother view is that these laws may have been directed toward a younger generation of blacks, 
unschooled in traditional racial etiquette.”).   
 42.  See KLARMAN, supra note 36, at 18 (“As southern railway transportation expanded 
after the war, black and white strangers came into closer proximity, leading to novel legislative 
efforts at social control.”); id. at 23 (“The same monopoly status that enabled railroads to set 
unreasonable rates also permitted them to ignore the segregationist preferences of white 
travelers. Thus, even libertarians often found railroad segregation statutes justifiable.”).  
 43.  LOFGREN, supra note 30, at 115 (quoting JOHN HALLER, OUTCASTS FROM EVOLUTION: 
SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES OF RACIAL INFERIORITY, 1859-1900, at 210 (1971)); see also KLARMAN, 
supra note 36, at 22 (quoting a Northern newspaper in 1896 observing that the notion of social 
equality between blacks and whites was “more unthinkable today than ever”). 
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their capacity to achieve—and it was prevalent on both sides of the 
sectional divide.44 Equally striking was the dearth of contestation of 
those claims.45 
Indeed, even the most prominent African American leaders at 
the time espoused separatist views. This was the era of Booker T. 
Washington, who expressed his support for de jure segregation in his 
famous Atlanta Exposition Address of 1895, stating, “In all things that 
are purely social we can be as separate as the fingers, yet one as the 
hand in all things essential to mutual progress.”46 Washington 
thought that agitation over social equality was “extremist folly” and 
that integration could not be achieved by “artificial forcing.”47 Even 
W.E.B. Du Bois, who would later oppose Washington on this point, 
said at the time: 
We must ever keep before us the fact that the South has some excuse for its present 
attitude. We must remember that a good many of our people are not fit for the 
responsibilities of republican government.  When you have the right sort of black voters, 
you will need no election laws. The battle of my people must be a moral one, not a legal 
or physical one.48 
With even black leaders supporting the racist status quo, it is hard to 
imagine a bench of white Justices espousing a more progressive view. 
As previously noted, the dominant understanding at the time was that  
“separate but equal” was the progressive view.49 
 
 44.  See LOFGREN, supra note 30, at 94–99, 106–10 (discussing ideas of black intellectual 
and moral infirmity that dominated public forums in the North and South); id. at 99 (“Pervasive 
as these views were in the South, perhaps the more significant consideration is that the attitudes 
crossed sectional lines.”).   
 45.  See id. at 110–11 (discussing lack of critical response to such open espousals of black 
inferiority and noting, “To say no one objected is not literally true. Among other dissenters, 
Frederick Douglass levied a withering attack on the idea of Negro inferiority in all its 
manifestations. . . . But Douglass died in 1895, and while he lived his influence was waning, his 
call for integration and racial assimilation becoming more suspect.”).   
 46.  3 BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, The Standard Printed Version of the Atlanta Exposition 
Address, in THE BOOKER T. WASHINGTON PAPERS, VOL. 3: 1889-95, 585 (Louis R. Harlan ed., 
1974); see also LOFGREN, supra note 30, at 111 (“Booker T. Washington’s later critic, W.E.B. Du 
Bois, identified Washington’s Atlanta Exposition Address, on September 18, 1895, as the event 
that more than any other made him ‘the one recognized spokesman of his ten million fellows and 
one of the most notable figures in a nation of seventy millions.’ ”).  
 47.  WASHINGTON, supra note 46, at 586 (“The wisest among my race understand that the 
agitation of questions of social equality is the extremist folly, and that progress in the enjoyment 
of all the privileges that will come to us must be the result of severe and constant struggle rather 
than an artificial forcing.”). 
 48.  LOFGREN, supra note 30, at 114 (quoting W.E.B. DuBois in 1891). 
 49.  See supra note 35 and accompanying text (noting that de jure segregation was viewed 
as “enlightened public policy” at the time); see also Klarman, supra note 30, at 338 (“According to 
the dominant contemporary understanding, segregation served the state interest in removing 
occasions for interracial friction and violence.”).  
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The prospect of the Supreme Court deciding Plessy the other 
way was slim-to-none for another reason as well—the law was stacked 
against it. The Fourteenth Amendment was clearly not intended to 
forbid racial classifications; language to accomplish that objective had 
been proposed by Reconstructionists, and rejected.50 Moreover, the 
same Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment had passed 
legislation to segregate D.C. schools.51 In addition, three decades of 
lower court decisions had sustained segregation on common carriers 
as a reasonable response to interracial friction and violence, and 
numerous lower courts had sustained segregated education against 
Fourteenth Amendment challenges.52 In short, the Supreme Court in 
Plessy was accurate in observing that de jure segregation had been 
“generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of 
the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power.”53 Indeed, 
the Court itself—with Justice Harlan in tow—had just sustained a 
state statute that imposed greater penalties for interracial fornication, 
so it had already rejected the conception of a colorblind Constitution 
that formed the basis of Harlan’s dissent.54 
Taken together, the law and the larger context made Plessy an 
easy case for the Justices,55 and the Supreme Court’s opinion relied on 
both, stating: 
In determining the question of reasonableness, [the state] is at liberty to act with 
reference to the established usages, customs and traditions of the people, and with a 
view to the promotion of their comfort and the preservation of the public peace and good 
order.  Gauged by this standard, we cannot say that a law which authorizes or even 
requires the separation of the races is unreasonable, or more obnoxious to the 
Fourteenth Amendment than the acts of congress requiring separate schools for colored 
 
 50.  See KLARMAN, supra note 36, at 18. Indeed, some Republicans opposed ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment as a result, while others supported it but lamented their inability to 
include a ban on racial classifications. See id.  
 51.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 36 (recognizing point); see also KLARMAN, supra 
note 36, at 19 (“Many northern whites, including some Republicans, still resisted black political 
rights, such as voting or jury service, and social rights, such as interracial marriage or school 
integration.”).  
 52.  See KLARMAN, supra note 36, at 20 (“For three decades, the decisions of lower courts 
had generally sustained segregation. Two lines of precedent were especially relevant: cases that 
sustained railroad practices of segregation and those that upheld school segregation laws.”); id. 
at 20–21 (discussing case law).  
 53.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896). 
 54.  See Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883); see also Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (“Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens . . . .”); Klarman, supra note 30, at 330 (discussing Pace in relation to Plessy). 
 55.  See LOFGREN, supra note 30, at 197 (quoting Justice Brown as recalling that the 
Justices had “little difficulty” deciding Plessy). 
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children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which does not seem to have 
been questioned . . . .56 
The legal landscape supported it, established custom supported it, 
black leaders supported it, and progressive policy arguments 
supported it. Little wonder Plessy received scant attention in the 
popular press.57 It was so utterly congruent with the tenor of the times 
that it was hardly deemed worthy of notice.58 
That leaves the question of Justice Harlan’s dissent. If the 
injustice of Plessy was so hard to see, why was he able to see it? One 
answer is that society is not monolithic. Even at a time when support 
for segregation was pervasive, there would have been outliers with 
seemingly radical views.59 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s division in 
Plessy may well have mirrored that of society more generally—elite 
and popular opinion were aligned on the issue of segregation, but this 
is not to say that there were no dissenters.60 
Other, more personal explanations also come to mind. Justice 
Harlan had a black half-brother, “an intelligent, articulate, 
enterprising figure who achieved considerable success within the 
black community.”61 Robert Harlan had been born a slave, but had 
purchased his freedom from his father.62 It is possible that Robert 
influenced Justice Harlan’s views, although even Robert was known to 
express “crude racial humor” about uneducated blacks, as was 
common among the “‘better’ elements” of the African American 
community at the time.63 Perhaps more significant was the fact that 
Justice Harlan had been a vigorous supporter of reconstruction and 
 
 56.  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550–51.   
 57.  See LOFGREN, supra note 30, at 196–97 (noting that “the most common press response 
was simply routine notice of the case, or no mention at all” and that the New York Times 
reported the decision on page three, in its regular Tuesday column on railway news, rather than 
on page one, where it reported several other Supreme Court decisions that day). 
 58.  See id. at 197 (“The indifference greeting Plessy had a still more fundamental 
source. . . . It embodied conventional wisdom.”); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: 
The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era, Part 1: The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 COLUM. 
L. REV. 444, 469 (1982) (“So closely did Plessy mirror the spirit of the age, however, that the 
country hardly noticed.”); Klarman, supra note 30, at 334 (“The strongest evidence that Plessy 
coincided with northern [as well as southern] white opinion is the generally indifferent reaction 
to the decision.”). 
 59.  See Klarman, supra note 30, at 332–33 (recognizing point).   
 60.  See id. at 306 (“[T]here was no evident disparity between elite and popular attitudes on 
issues like racial segregation . . . .”); id. at 320 (“Moreover, the relatively little we know about the 
racial views of the Plessy Court Justices suggests no reason to doubt that their predilections 
roughly mirrored that of the general population.”); supra note 45 (quoting historian as noting, 
“To say no one objected is not literally true”). 
 61.  TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JUDICIAL ENIGMA: THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN 141 (1995).   
 62.  Id. at 141. 
 63.  See id. at 141–42 (discussing Justice Harlan’s relationship with Robert Harlan).  
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the ideals it represented before joining the bench.64 The Justice’s close 
friendship with Frederick Douglass, who two decades earlier had been 
one of the most visible black leaders of the reconstruction era and was 
an ardent supporter of egalitarianism, also likely impacted his 
views.65 
Even so, Justice Harlan likewise reflected the normative 
assumptions of his time. His dissent in Plessy was tinged with racial 
animus for Asians,66 and just three years after Plessy, he wrote the 
unanimous opinion in a Supreme Court decision that upheld separate 
and unequal education, sustaining Georgia’s defunding of its only 
black high school.67 Perhaps Justice Harlan’s reconstructionist views 
were limited to de jure segregation; perhaps he was just inconsistent. 
Whatever the reason, at least this much is true: Justice Harlan may 
have been prescient on segregation, but he was hardly colorblind. 
In sum, to portray Plessy as a moral failure—a case where the 
Supreme Court could have, and should have, done better—is to fail to 
appreciate the historical context in which it was decided. The values 
that animated Plessy are widely repudiated today, but they were a 
part of the cultural milieu in which the Justices were operating at that 
time. Indeed, in light of the social, political, and legal landscape of 
1896, it is hard to imagine the Justices ruling any other way than they 
did.68 Plessy’s attorney knew this. He had appealed to the Supreme 
Court but was in no hurry for its ruling, noting, “The Court has 
always been the foe of liberty until forced to move on by public 
opinion.”69 Ironically, his case—Plessy—is Exhibit A for that being 
true. 
 
 64.  See id. (discussing Justice Harlan’s reconstructionist views and noting that when he 
was nominated to the bench, one black official told him that he was “well thought of by the 
influential colored man for what he believes to have been your interest in behalf of his oppressed 
race”).  
 65.  Id. at 142–43 (discussing friendship with Frederick Douglass); see also supra note 45 
(noting that Frederick Douglass was an exception to the silence that met open espousals of black 
inferiority, but he died in 1895 after waning popularity and influence). 
 66.  See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“There is a 
race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of 
the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions, absolutely excluded from our 
country. I allude to the Chinese race.”); id. (explaining as a point of hypocrisy that a “Chinaman” 
can ride in the same transportation as a white person, when a black person cannot). 
 67.  See Cumming v. Cty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 542–45 (1899). 
 68.  See Klarman, supra note 23, at 26 (“To portray Plessy as simply a product of racist 
judging is to fundamentally misunderstand it. Background social, political, economic, and 
ideological forces created a climate within which judicial invalidation of a railway segregation 
law would have been dramatically countermajoritarian, and indeed virtually unthinkable.”). 
 69.  LOFGREN, supra note 30, at 149 (quoting Plessy’s attorney Albion Tourgee). 
Interestingly, even the choice of Homer Plessy for the test case, a man who was seven-eighths 
Caucasian with “the mixture of colored blood . . . not discernable in him,” suggests some 
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II. BUCK V. BELL 
Decided in 1927, Buck v. Bell upheld the forced sterilization of 
women of childbearing age deemed “idiotic, imbecile, feeble-minded or 
epileptic.”70  As others have noted, Buck is widely considered to be one 
of the worst decisions in Supreme Court history, earning its place next 
to Plessy and Korematsu in the Supreme Court “hall of shame.”71 Buck 
is bad in part because it gave the green light to forced sterilization 
(and thousands upon thousands ensued).72  And Buck is bad in part 
because its jarring rhetoric came from one of the most revered jurists 
of all time—Oliver Wendell Holmes.73 It was Justice Holmes who 
wrote the infamous line, “Three generations of imbeciles are 
enough,”74 leaving us all a little less innocent of the Court’s 
imperfections than before. Of Buck v. Bell, Chemerinsky 
understandably asks, “How could the Supreme Court have failed so 
miserably?”75 
One answer is that Buck v. Bell had little chance of coming out 
the other way; the parties had colluded on its outcome from the start. 
To understand the point requires some understanding of the legal 
landscape at the time.  Between 1907 and 1922, a dozen states passed 
 
appreciation that it would be an uphill battle from the start, as did the fallback position in the 
case that Plessy had been misclassified. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552 (“Under the allegations of his 
petition, it may undoubtedly become a question of importance whether, under the laws of 
Louisiana, the petitioner belongs to the white or colored race.”). 
 70.  See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).  
 71.  See PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME 
COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL xiii (2008) (“The Buck case represents one of the low points in 
Supreme Court history—on a par with Plessy v. Ferguson, which announced the now-discredited 
legal doctrine of ‘separate but equal,’ and the Korematsu case, which permitted the internment of 
Japanese citizens during World War II.”); Victoria Nourse, Buck v. Bell: A Constitutional 
Tragedy from a Lost World, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 101, 101 (2011) (“A mere five paragraphs long, Buck 
v. Bell could represent the highest ratio of injustice per word ever signed on to by eight Supreme 
Court Justices, progressive and conservative alike.”). 
 72.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 4 (“Thousands more were surgically sterilized as a 
result of this decision. In the United States, by 1935, more than twenty thousand forced 
sterilizations had occurred . . . .”). 
 73.  See id. at 3 (“None other than the eminent Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., regarded 
as one of the greatest jurists in American history, wrote the opinion for the Court against her.”); 
COHEN, supra note 10, at 1 (noting that Justice Holmes is “widely considered to be one of the 
greatest legal minds—if not the greatest—in American history”); Robert J. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: 
“Felt Necessities” v. Fundamental Values?, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1418, 1460 (1981) (referring to 
Holmes as “one of the patron saints of modern civil liberties”). 
 74.  Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. 
 75.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 4. 
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involuntary sterilization laws of the type at issue in Buck.76 As 
Chemerinsky notes, most of the courts to consider their 
constitutionality had struck them down, although it also merits  
mention that every one of those cases was decided on procedural 
grounds.77 No court had held that states lacked the power to sterilize 
their feebleminded; the hitch was how they were going about it.78 In 
1922, a treatise analyzed these lower court cases and proposed a 
model code designed to withstand legal scrutiny.79 Virginia passed its 
sterilization law in 1924 based on this model code, and its backers 
were in search of a test case to validate it.80 That case was Buck v. 
Bell. 
The facts could not have been better suited for their purpose. 
Virginia’s sterilization statute applied only to those who had been 
institutionalized for hereditary feeblemindedness (or other allegedly 
hereditary disorders) and who were capable of bearing children.81 
Carrie Buck fit the bill perfectly. She had been sent to the Virginia 
Colony for the Epileptic and Feebleminded just after the birth of her 
illegitimate daughter, Vivian.82 When she arrived at the Colony, her 
mother Emma was already there, having been committed to the 
Colony four years earlier.83 Carrie was almost eighteen, but had an 
 
 76.  See Paul A. Lombardo, Disability, Eugenics, and the Culture Wars, 2 ST. LOUIS U. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 57, 61 n.33 (2008) (listing twelve states that passed involuntary sterilization 
statutes).  
 77.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 4 (“In fact, most lower courts to consider the issue 
prior to Buck v. Bell had declared involuntary sterilization unconstitutional.”); see also Cynkar, 
supra note 73, at 1434 (“In the litigation which arose from these laws, the sterilization plans of 
seven states were held unconstitutional.”). 
 78.  See Cynkar, supra note 73, at 1446 (“It was true that seven sterilization laws had been 
struck down by lower courts, but all seven states had been guilty of procedural irregularities. 
Significantly, the eugenic idea itself had consistently been accepted by every judicial forum in 
which it had been argued.”).  
 79.  See generally HARRY H. LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
REPORT OF THE PSYCHOPATHIC LABORATORY OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO (1922). 
 80.  See LOMBARDO, supra note 71, at 97 (“The language . . . used [in Virginia’s law] and the 
arguments for the hereditary nature of mental and physical defects were taken, in many places 
verbatim, from Harry Laughlin’s Model Law, printed in Eugenical Sterilization in the United 
States.”); id. at 102 (noting that the Colony’s advocate in the Virginia General Assembly “advised 
that all sterilizations be postponed until the Virginia law had been validated by the Court of 
Appeals of Virginia and ‘possibly the Supreme Court of the United States’ ”). 
 81.  See Cynkar, supra note 73, at 1436–37 (discussing Virginia’s sterilization statute).   
 82.  See LOMBARDO, supra note 71, at 103–05 (discussing Carrie Buck’s pregnancy and 
subsequent commitment to the Colony).  
 83.  See id. at 105–06 (discussing Emma Buck’s arrival at the Colony and describing her as 
suffering from pneumonia, rheumatism, and syphilis, with scars from intravenous injections 
suggesting illicit drug use).   
         
1034 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:4:1019 
estimated mental age of nine.84 Her mother Emma had an estimated 
mental age of eight,85 and her daughter Vivian, who was still an 
infant, had been described as “not quite right.”86 Hence, the “three 
generations of imbeciles”—the word “imbecile” tracking the language 
of the statute, which in turn tracked the technical term used by 
professionals at that time.87 
But the facts were not what made the case a surefire loser for 
Carrie Buck; it was her lawyer. As it turns out, Carrie’s lawyer was a 
close confidant of the lawyer for the Colony, as well as an ardent 
sterilization supporter.88 In fact, he had been a founding member of 
the Colony’s board of directors, with a building there bearing his 
name.89 At trial, Carrie’s attorney did not contest the state’s right to 
deprive the feebleminded of the ability to procreate.90 Nor did he 
contest the notion that feeblemindedness was hereditary, or that 
Carrie (or her mother or her daughter) was feebleminded.91 He called 
no witnesses, offered no evidence, and presented no defense.92 In 
short, Buck v. Bell was the quintessential friendly suit. Carrie’s 
attorney cross-examined the witnesses (sort of) and made procedural 
 
 84.  Her IQ was listed as fifty-six. Id. at 105; see also id. at 107 (noting mental age of nine 
when tested at age eighteen); Cynkar, supra note 73, at 1437 (noting that Carrie Buck was 
committed “a few weeks before her eighteenth birthday and shortly after the birth of her 
illegitimate child”); but see infra note 91 (noting room to doubt whether findings of 
feeblemindedness were true). 
 85.  Cynkar, supra note 73, at 1418. Emma’s IQ was listed as fifty. LOMBARDO, supra note 
71, at 106. 
 86.  See LOMBARDO, supra note 71, at x (“Experts had examined the infant, saying she was 
‘below average’ and ‘not quite right’ . . . .”). 
 87.  Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 312 n.* (1925) (quoting 1924 Va. Acts 569); Nourse, supra 
note 71, at 104 (“ ‘[I]mbecile’ along with ‘moron’ and ‘idiot’ were technical terms used by 
sociologists, psychologists, zoologists, and even geneticists of the day.”).   
 88.  LOMBARDO, supra note 71, at 107. 
 89.  See id. at xi (noting that Carrie Buck’s lawyer “was a founding member of the Virginia 
Colony’s board of directors and a major supporter of the sterilization campaign”); COHEN, supra 
note 10, at 98 (noting that the Colony had a building named in honor of the man who 
represented Carrie Buck to recognize his role in its history).   
 90.  Rather, he conceded it. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 13, Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 
(1927) (No. 292) (“We concede that the State has the right to segregate the feebleminded and 
thereby deprive them of the ‘power to procreate.’ ”); see also Cynkar, supra note 73, at 1448 
(noting that Carrie Buck’s lawyer “never challenged the eugenical idea which shaped the public 
policy, nor questioned the power of the state to execute that policy by some means”). 
 91.  LOMBARDO, supra note 71, at 152–53. This is arguably the real tragedy in the case, as 
there is considerable room to doubt whether Carrie was in fact feebleminded, or her daughter, or 
even her mother. See Cynkar, supra note 73, at 1458 (noting that Carrie’s daughter Vivian had 
completed second grade when she died from childhood measles and was considered “very 
bright”); Lombardo, supra note 76, at 62 (“[T]he real story of the Bucks was much more complex: 
Carrie herself had been raped, her daughter Vivian was perfectly normal, and the case itself was 
a fraud.”). 
 92.  See LOMBARDO, supra note 71, at 118–20, 152–54 (detailing representation).  
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claims,93 but he failed to put the state’s case to any serious test. 
Lamenting the result in Buck v. Bell, one Catholic priest wrote to 
another at the time that he wished the girl’s lawyer had mounted a 
better defense, but since that had not happened, “I do not see how the 
court could have rendered any other decision in view of the facts 
before it.”94 The facts were uncontested, the statute carefully drawn, 
and the procedural protections scrupulously followed.95 One reason 
Buck v. Bell came out the way it did is because the parties never 
intended it to come out the other way. 
But even if that had not been the case, it is hard to fathom the 
Supreme Court ruling other than it did in light of the tenor of the 
times. To understand why requires some understanding of the 
eugenics movement that dominated the first three decades of the 
twentieth century96—a movement that emerged around the turn of the 
century from the confluence of several bodies of thought. The first was 
social Darwinism, “survival of the fittest” applied to the human 
experience in society.97 “If they are sufficiently complete to live, they 
 
 93.  See id. at 118, 126–27 (reproducing portions of cross examination of Colony’s expert 
witness); Cynkar, supra note 73, at 1446–48 (discussing arguments in brief challenging 
sterilization statute). Carrie Buck challenged the sterilization law on due process and equal 
protection grounds. Buck, 274 U.S. at 205. The Supreme Court rejected both in unequivocal 
terms. See id. at 207: 
There can be no doubt that, so far as procedure is concerned, the rights of the patient 
are most carefully considered, and, as every step in this case was taken in scrupulous 
compliance with the statute and after months of observation, there is no doubt that, in 
that respect, the plaintiff in error has had due process of law. 
See also id. at 208: 
But, it is said, however it might be if this reasoning were applied generally, it fails 
when it is confined to the small number who are in the institutions named and is not 
applied to the multitudes outside. It is the usual last resort of constitutional 
arguments to point out shortcomings of this sort. But the answer is that the law does 
all that is needed when it does all that it can . . . . 
 94.  CHRISTINE ROSEN, PREACHING EUGENICS: RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND THE AMERICAN 
EUGENICS MOVEMENT 151 (2004). 
 95.  See supra note 93 (quoting opinion in Buck v. Bell).   
 96.  See STEVEN SELDEN, INHERITING SHAME: THE STORY OF EUGENICS AND RACISM IN 
AMERICA 1 (1999) (“In the early decades of the 20th century, the assumptions that race and 
heredity were central to human development and social progress were basic components of 
American social thought.”); Cynkar, supra note 73, at 1420 (noting the “hereditarian attitudes 
that had shaped social thought in America during the first three decades of the twentieth 
century”).  
 97.  See JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-
1925, at 135 (1955) (“What stood out in the first instance, as the great social lesson of the theory 
of natural selection, was not the ravages of the struggle for survival but rather the idea of ‘the 
survival of the fittest.’ ”); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 6 
(1955) (“The most popular catchwords of Darwinism, ‘struggle for existence’ and ‘survival of the 
fittest,’ when applied to the life of man in society, suggested that nature would provide that the 
best competitors in a competitive situation would win, and that this process would lead to 
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live and it is well that they should live. If they are not sufficiently 
complete to live, they die and it is best they should die,” wrote Herbert 
Spencer, the leading social Darwinist, in 1851.98 Next was the work of 
Francis Galton, who believed that the traits that determined society’s 
“fittest” were inherited, producing numerous studies to that effect and 
coining the term “eugenics”—the “science of good breeding”—in 
1883.99 Then in 1900, the rediscovery of Gregor Mendel’s work on pea 
plants gave eugenics the scientific explanation it had lacked.100 
Mendel found that when he cross-fertilized pea plants, certain traits 
were transmitted in predictable ways; some traits were dominant, 
some were recessive, and one could control outcomes by recognizing 
the two.101 With the last piece of the puzzle in place, the eugenics 
movement was born. 
For many, it came just in the nick of time. The development of 
early IQ tests suggested that genetic feeblemindedness and 
degeneracy were on the rise, distressing professionals and creating 
massive anxiety among the public.102 The concern was not just about 
the cost of caring for the feebleminded and the strain it put on the 
 
continuing improvement.”); Cynkar, supra note 73, at 1420 (“Social Darwinists saw the existing 
social order as the result of healthy competition in which the ‘fittest’ survived.”). 
 98.  HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 380 (1851). Ironically, what came to be known as 
social Darwinism in fact predated Darwinism by almost a decade. Compare SPENCER, supra, 
with CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859). Thanks to Eric Berger for sharing this 
insight. 
 99.  See FRANCIS GALTON, HEREDITARY GENIUS: AN INQUIRY INTO ITS LAWS AND 
CONSEQUENCES (1869); FRANCIS GALTON, INQUIRIES INTO HUMAN FACULTY AND ITS 
DEVELOPMENT 44 (1883); see also HIGHAM, supra note 97, at 150 (discussing Galton’s work); 
LOMBARDO, supra note 71, at xi (referring to eugenics as the “science of good breeding”); SELDEN, 
supra note 96, at 2 (also discussing Galton’s work).  
 100.  See HOFSTADTER, supra note 97, at 163 (noting that “Mendel’s studies in heredity 
placed in the hands of geneticists the organizing principle which their inquiries had lacked and 
gave them fresh confidence in the possibilities of their research for prediction and control”); 
LOMBARDO, supra note 71, at 30 (discussing Mendel’s work); Cynkar, supra note 73, at 1421 
(same).   
 101.  See SELDEN, supra note 96, at 2–3; Cynkar, supra note 73, at 1421.  
 102.  See COHEN, supra note 10, at 25 (“The nation was in the midst of a panic over 
feeblemindedness.”); Cynkar, supra note 73, at 1424:  
The past few years have witnessed a striking awakening of professional and popular 
consciousness of the widespread prevalence of feeblemindedness and its influence as a 
source of wretchedness to the patient himself and to his family, and as a causative 
factor in the production of crime, prostitution, pauperism, illegitimacy, intemperance, 
and other complex social diseases . . . . 
(quoting S.P. DAVIES, SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE FEEBLEMINDED 56 (1923)); see also SELDEN, supra 
note 96, at 23–27 (discussing and reproducing pictures of various displays at exhibitions and 
state fairs such as “Some People Are Born to Be a Burden on the Rest,” which illustrated with 
flashing lights how “the rising tide of bad heredity” was threatening the nation’s economic well-
being); Cynkar, supra note 73, at 1423–25 (discussing early Binet-Simon IQ tests and alarming 
results). 
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public coffers and private charities;103 it was also the fear that the 
“weak in mind” were “weak in will” and thus more likely to propagate, 
exacerbating the problem.104 “Those least fit to carry on the race are 
increasing most rapidly,” wrote progressive feminist and birth control 
advocate Margaret Sanger, echoing prevailing wisdom at the time.105 
With the degenerate population rising and the prospect of a multiplier 
effect making it worse, the question of what to do about it became the 
most pressing question of its time.106 
Eugenics offered an answer. For eugenicists, feeblemindedness 
was a congenital defect, a simple Mendelian recessive.107 Although few 
eugenicists advocated denying help to those who needed it so social 
Darwinism could run its course, most favored controlling the number 
of unfit going forward as the preferred alternative to building more 
institutions to house them.108 Charity just allowed degenerates to keep 
 
 103.  See NANCY ORDOVER, AMERICAN EUGENICS: RACE, QUEER ANATOMY, AND THE SCIENCE 
OF NATIONALISM 147 (2003) (“Every year millions of dollars are collected in taxes and spent on 
the maintenance of the defective, the feeble-minded, the insane and the criminals.” (quoting 
Unprofitable Children: Are These Bodies Fit Temples for Immortal Souls?, 5 BIRTH CONTROL 
REV. 129, 144 (1924)); id. (“Billions of dollars are expended by our state and federal governments 
and by private charities and philanthropies for the care, maintenance, and perpetuation of these 
classes.” (quoting Margaret Sanger, Address of Welcome at the Sixth International Neo-
Malthusian Conference (March 25, 1925))); id. at 148 (quoting Margaret Sanger, Address of 
Welcome at the Sixth International Neo-Malthusian Conference (March 25, 1925)): 
If the millions upon millions of dollars which are now being expended in the care and 
maintenance of those who in all kindness should never have been brought into this 
world were converted to a system of bonuses to unfit parents, paying them to refrain 
from further parenthood, and continuing to pay them while they controlled their 
procreative faculties, this would not only be a profitable investment, but the salvation 
of American civilization.  
 104.  LOMBARDO, supra note 71, at 6; see also id. at 16 (noting that “the image of the ‘moral 
degenerate,’ a woman defective in mind as well as morals, remained a powerful rallying point for 
various kinds of reformers who would ultimately endorse the twin policies of segregation and 
sterilization”); id. at 118 (“[A] feebleminded girl is much more likely to go wrong.”) (quoting 
Transcript of Record at 65–69, Buck v. Bell, 130 S.E. 516 (Va. 1925)).  
 105.  ORDOVER, supra note 103, at 140 (quoting Margaret Sanger, The Eugenic Value of 
Birth Control Propaganda, BIRTH CONTROL REV., no. 10, Oct. 1921, at 5).  
 106.  See id. at 140 (“[T]he most urgent problem today is how to limit and discourage the 
overfertility of the mentally and physically defective.” (quoting Margaret Sanger, The Eugenic 
Value of Birth Control Propaganda, BIRTH CONTROL REV., no. 10, Oct. 1921, at 5)); COHEN, supra 
note 10, at 25 (quoting editorial opining that “of all the matters facing state governments, ‘none 
is more pressing than the care of the feeble-minded’ ”); see also infra text accompanying note 136 
(quoting Michigan Supreme Court as noting the “growing belief that, due to the alarming 
increase in the number of degenerates, criminals, feeble-minded, and insane, our race is facing 
the greatest peril of all time”). 
 107.  See Cynkar, supra note 73, at 1422. 
 108.  See, e.g., CHARLES B. DAVENPORT, EUGENICS: THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN IMPROVEMENT 
BY BETTER BREEDING 31–32 (1910) (read before the American Academy of Medicine at Yale 
University, Nov. 12, 1909): 
Shall we as an intelligent people, proud of our control of nature in other respects, do 
nothing but vote more taxes or be satisfied with the great gifts and bequests that 
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breeding, they argued.109 Degeneracy was inherited, so the solution 
was simple—stop propagating the strain that produced it.110 In one, 
maybe two generations, the problem would take care of itself.111 
Genetic problems allowed for genetic solutions, the argument went.112 
And so it was that the eugenic premise was also its promise—that 
science could be harnessed to prevent suffering, protect the physical 
and fiscal health of future generations, and make society a better 
place.113 It was seductively sensible and optimistic, which was part of 
what made it so popular.114 
 
philanthropists have made for the support of the delinquent, defective and dependent 
classes? Shall we not rather take the steps that scientific study dictates as necessary 
to dry up the springs that feed the torrent of defective and degenerate protoplasm? 
See also LOMBARDO, supra note 71, at 50 (noting that eugenicists saw euthanasia as effective but 
“too dear a moral price”). 
 109.  See LOMBARDO, supra note 71, at 19 (noting eugenic “conventional wisdom: mental 
defect was hereditary; charity only encouraged people to multiply irresponsibly; excessive tax 
money was spent on social welfare—and the amount was growing”). 
 110.  See Cynkar, supra note 73, at 1428 (noting the “fundamental premise [of eugenics] that 
‘much social inadequacy is of a deep-seated biological nature, and can be remedied only by 
cutting off the human strains that produce it’ ” (quoting HARRY H. LAUGHLIN, EUGENICS RECORD 
OFFICE BULLETIN NO. 10A: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY AND TO REPORT ON THE BEST 
PRACTICAL MEANS OF CUTTING OFF THE DEFECTIVE GERM-PLASM IN THE AMERICAN POPULATION 
54–55 (1914))); Michelle Oberman, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Buck v. Bell: Thoughts 
Occasioned by Paul Lombardo’s Three Generations, No Imbeciles, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 357, 374 
(2010) (“It is a vicious cycle; ignorance breeds poverty and poverty breeds ignorance. There is 
only one cure for both, and that is to stop breeding these things.” (quoting MARGARET SANGER, 
WHAT EVERY BOY AND GIRL SHOULD KNOW 140 (1915))). 
 111.  See LOMBARDO, supra note 71, at 50 (noting the eugenic goal to “largely but not entirely 
eliminate from the race the source of supply of the great anti-social human varieties within two 
generations”); Cynkar, supra note 73, at 1425 (quoting the president of the University of 
Wisconsin in 1914 as stating, “We know enough about eugenics so that if the knowledge were 
applied, the defective classes would disappear within a generation.”; and MARK HALLER, 
EUGENICS: HEREDITARIAN ATTITUDES IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 76 (1963)). 
 112.  See SELDEN, supra note 96, at 36 (quoting Charles Davenport) (“Man is an animal, and 
permanent racial progress in eugenics must be based on the laws of biology.”); Kevin E. Grady, A 
Review of Three Generations, No Imbeciles: Eugenics, the Supreme Court, and Buck v. Bell, 26 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1295, 1299 (2010) (“[T]he eugenic premise that mental disorders and social 
problems were linked to genetic inheritance and that the major ills of society (crime and poverty) 
could be cured through a selective control of heredity.”). 
 113.  See Paul A. Lombardo, Taking Eugenics Seriously: Three Generations of ??? are 
Enough?, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 191, 211 (2008) (“The attraction to eugenics for many was that it 
promised, if not a medical Utopia, free of diseases, at least a future in which some debilitating 
conditions could be relegated to the dustbin of history.”); Oberman, supra note 110, at 359 
(noting that “eugenics-based activism was imbued with their conviction that they had a deep 
responsibility to protect and promote the future of civilization”). 
 114.  See Lombardo, supra note 113, at 208 (noting that the “clearly philanthropic motive” of 
the eugenics movement is what made it “extraordinarily popular”); id. at 211 (noting the 
“seductive message of the eugenics movement . . . that science could be used to alleviate suffering 
and improve the human condition”). 
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And popular it was. The eugenics movement appealed to 
conservatives with its social Darwinism and fiscal responsibility, and 
to progressives with its pragmatic approach to social reform.115 Little 
wonder that leaders across a wide range of fields were vocal 
supporters.116 The first six presidents of the twentieth century—
Theodore Roosevelt, William Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Warren Harding, 
Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover—all supported eugenics.117 So 
did more than a dozen Nobel Peace Prize winners from the sciences, 
including the nation’s top two geneticists.118 Leaders in higher 
education supported eugenics, as did “the father of American medical 
education,” William Welch, who served as the first dean of the school 
of medicine at Johns Hopkins and as president of the American 
Medical Association.119 Winston Churchill, Alexander Graham Bell, 
Thomas Edison, Hellen Keller—Hellen Keller—Margaret Sanger, Jack 
London, and Anthony Comstock all endorsed eugenics.120 Wealthy 
philanthropists and their foundations supported it too.121 
At the grassroots level, evidence of the popularity of eugenics 
was pervasive. There were “better babies” and “fitter families” 
contests at state fairs, eugenic films, books, textbooks, traveling 
exhibitions, sermon contests, and even eugenic marriage certificates 
 
 115.  See COHEN, supra note 10, at 57 (“At the same time, eugenics exerted a strong appeal 
to conservatives. Many were drawn to its insistence that there was a natural elite and that . . . 
helping the genetically disadvantaged would only increase the number of criminals and welfare 
cases.”); SELDEN, supra note 96, at 24 (“[Eugenics] were the proposals of a progressive 
organization, made during the Progressive Era, and they drew progressive supporters.”); Edward 
J. Larson, Putting Buck v. Bell in Scientific and Historical Context, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 119, 120 
(2011) (“No one party or ideology was to blame. At the time, eugenics laws of the type enacted in 
Virginia were supported by conservatives and progressives; Republicans and Democrats; 
scientists and lay people, Christians and Jews.”).  
 116.  See MARK A. LARGENT, BREEDING CONTEMPT: THE HISTORY OF COERCED STERILIZATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES 2–3 (2008) (discussing “those responsible for the tens of thousands of 
coerced sterilizations” and noting that “American biologists were merely one segment of a 
movement that included thousands of scientists, politicians, social activists, philanthropists, 
educators, and assorted do-gooders, racists, and utopians.”). 
 117.  See Lombardo, supra note 76, at 74. 
 118.  See Larson, supra note 115, at 123; Lombardo, supra note 113, at 209.  
 119.  See Larson, supra note 115, at 123; Lombardo, supra note 113, at 212.  
 120.  See Larson, supra note 115, at 123; Lombardo, supra note 113, at 210–11; Grady, supra 
note 112, at 1297. Helen Keller’s support may be explained by the fact that she became deaf and 
blind from a childhood illness, rather than hereditary condition. See Larson, supra note 115, at 
123. 
 121.  See Grady, supra note 112, at 1297 (“Major philanthropists, such as the Carnegie 
Foundation, E.M. Harriman, and John D. Rockefeller helped fund eugenic efforts . . . .”); Larson, 
supra note 115, at 123 (“Wealthy philanthropists and foundations vied to support eugenics 
research and lawmaking.”).   
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issued by the Surgeon General.122 By 1915, eugenics was so popular 
that it had become a fad,123 although its followers fervently denied it. 
“Eugenics is a science. It is a fact, not a fad,” wrote the Assistant 
Surgeon General at the time.124 
In the first two decades of the twentieth century, eugenic 
ideology (and the ideologies it served) found expression in numerous 
areas of the law. Anti-miscegenation statutes were hardly new, but 
added to their rank were “eugenic marriage laws” that required 
premarital testing for certain conditions and prohibited marriage of 
the unfit.125 The Immigration Act of 1924 and the draconian quotas it 
set on immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe likewise 
represented a eugenic (and racist and nativist) attempt to protect the 
integrity of Anglo-American stock.126 Even more explicit were 
institutionalization and sterilization statutes, which directly 
implemented the eugenics ideal. By 1927, when the Supreme Court 
decided Buck v. Bell, twenty-seven of the forty-eight states had 
sterilization statutes, and many more had provisions to 
 
 122.  See COHEN, supra note 10, at 3–4, 59–62 (same); see also LOMBARDO, supra note 71, at 
45, 55 (discussing eugenic certificate issued by surgeon general, as well as eugenic books and 
plays); SELDEN, supra note 96, at 23–36 (discussing various phenomena illustrating popularity of 
eugenics).   
 123.  See HOFSTADTER, supra note 97, at 161 (“Eugenics then grew with such great rapidity 
that by 1915 it had reached the dimensions of a fad.”); see also HIGHAM, supra note 97, at 150–51 
(noting that from 1910 to 1914 “the general magazines carried more articles on eugenics than on 
the three questions of slums, tenements, and living standards, combined”).   
 124.  Lombardo, supra note 113, at 210 (quoting assistant Surgeon General Dr. W.C. 
Rucker). 
 125.  See COHEN, supra note 10, at 63 (discussing eugenic marriage laws and noting that 
“Marriage prohibitions were a major advance for the eugenics movement: they were the first 
laws to endorse the goal of reducing reproduction of the ‘unfit.’ ”); LOMBARDO, supra note 71, at 
46 (noting that “laws requiring testing for syphilis or other conditions that affected fertility were 
routinely labeled ‘eugenic marriage laws,’ ” and that some clergymen “would perform no 
marriages . . . until the parties to the union obtained a ‘clean bill of health’ ”). 
 126.  See COHEN, supra note 10, at 132–35 (discussing role of eugenicists in passing the 
Immigration Act of 1924); ORDOVER, supra note 103, at 1 (quoting Biological Aspects of 
Immigration, Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 66th Cong. 3 
(1920) (statement of Harry H. Laughlin, Secretary, Eugenics Research Ass’n):  
The character of the nation is determined primarily by its racial qualities; that is, by 
the hereditary physical, mental, and moral or temperamental traits of its people . . . . 
It is now high time that the eugenical element, that is, the factor of natural hereditary 
qualities which will determine our future characteristics and safety, receive due 
consideration.; 
see also HIGHAM, supra note 97, at 151 (“From the eugenicists’ point of view, the immigration 
question was at heart a biological one, and to them admitting ‘degenerate breeding stock’ seemed 
one of the worst sins the nation could commit against itself.”); Cynkar, supra note 73, at 1427 
(noting that eugenics “did much to put growing American nativism and racism on a ‘scientific’ 
basis”). 
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institutionalize feebleminded women of childbearing age until they 
were no longer fertile.127 
In the early years, institutionalization was viewed as the more 
genteel option.128 Even Catholics, who thought reproductive matters 
were for God alone to decide, tended to support institutionalization.129 
But as time passed, the tide turned. “It is vastly more humane to 
relieve these individuals of a function which they cannot properly use 
and allow them to return to their homes or society than to keep them 
confined in an institution for the greater part of their young lives,” 
argued supporters of sterilization.130 Sterilization was physically 
invasive, but it gave the feebleminded their freedom, accomplished the 
eugenic objective, and was less taxing than institutionalization on the 
public fisc.131 In short, it was progressive. 
None of this is to deny that within the scientific community, 
there were growing concerns about the genetic claims that eugenicists 
made. But such scientific debates played out mostly in the pages of 
obscure journals and were slow to change the predominant view.132 
 
 127.  See Nourse, supra note 71, at 104 (discussing statutes); see also LOMBARDO, supra note 
71, at 18 (discussing Virginia’s 1912 institutionalization law for feebleminded “women of child-
bearing age, from twelve to forty-five years of age”); Larson, supra note 115, at 124 (discussing 
state sterilization statutes and noting that “[m]any more states enacted measures to compel the 
sexual segregation of mentally ill or retarded persons”).  
 128.  See Cynkar, supra note 73, at 1429 (noting that “[a] nationwide plan of mandatory, 
long-term custodial care” was widely deemed to be “the most human method” of preventing 
propagation and that compulsory sterilization was viewed as “a quite drastic step” that “for 
many, directly assaulted the sense of human dignity”). 
 129.  See ROSEN, supra note 94, at 148 (describing the Catholic view of institutionalization 
“as a form of ‘kindly detention’ that served the best interests of society without violating the 
natural rights of the feebleminded” and thus could “enjoy Catholic support”); id. at 151 (“[A]ll 
Catholic authorities admit that such persons as the one whose case came before the Court may 
be segregated and prevented from becoming parents in state institutions and colonies.” (quoting 
Letter from John A. Ryan to J.G. Hearty (May 9, 1927))).   
 130.  Cynkar, supra note 73, at 1430 (quoting John H. Bell enunciating “the classic rationale 
for eugenic sterilization”).  
 131.  See COHEN, supra note 10, at 5 (“Segregation was expensive: states could not build 
enough institutions to house all the people the eugenicists wanted to stop from having children. 
Sterilization, however, was completely effective, and it could be carried out on a mass scale.”); 
LOMBARDO, supra note 71, at 96–98 (discussing economic and other grounds for sterilization as 
opposed to institutionalization, and noting that “the implication was clear that life outside of an 
institution, even after sterilization, was better than life within one”).  
 132.  See LOMBARDO, supra note 71, at 56 (“[T]hough the press regularly printed critiques of 
so-called eugenic marriage laws, disagreement among scientists remained muffled, generally 
hidden in the pages of obscure journals. The public heard other voices . . . .”); Cynkar, supra note 
73, at 1455–56 (“It took over a decade for newer studies to overcome the attitudes generated by 
the early eugenic research. Most of the serious criticism of eugenic ideas was just beginning in 
the 1920s.”); see also LARGENT, supra note 116, at 97–99 (discussing “voices of opposition before 
Buck” and noting that “By and large, early opponents to coerced sterilization were lone voices in 
their professions, and they were inconsistent in attacking some aspects of the compulsory 
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Not until the 1930s did the eugenics movement start to wane—in part 
because of scientific advances,133 and in part because its champions 
died or retired and no one stepped up to the helm.134 As we now know, 
the Justices in Buck v. Bell were not presented with evidence of early 
qualms about the scientific basis for eugenics.135 Yet even if they had 
been, there is reason to doubt it would have made a difference; the one 
court that heard such evidence in 1925 thought the scientific basis 
still sound and upheld sterilization as a valid exercise of the state’s 
police power “based on the growing belief that, due to the alarming 
increase in the number of degenerates, criminals, feebleminded, and 
insane, our race is facing the greatest peril of all time.”136 This was the 
context in which the Supreme Court decided Buck v. Bell. 
The decision was relatively easy for the Justices; progressives, 
conservatives, and even the Supreme Court’s libertarians joined in the 
 
sterilization laws while supporting others. Before the late 1920s, it was rare to find an author 
who unequivocally rejected the idea of coerced sterilizations . . .”); id. at 116 (“Beginning in the 
early 1930s, some of the American professions that supported eugenics and compulsory 
sterilization, including physicians, social scientist, and biologists, slowly withdrew their 
support.”). 
 133.  See Larson, supra note 115, at 127 (discussing the 1936 report of the American 
Neurological Association “which some historians credit with turning the tide of American 
scientific opinion against compulsory eugenics”; and ABRAHAM MYERSON ET AL., EUGENICAL 
STERILIZATION: A REORIENTATION OF THE PROBLEM 177–83 (1936)); see also Cynkar, supra note 
73, at 1456 (explaining that in the 1930s, “studies in other social sciences began to shift thought 
away from purely hereditarian explanations of human behavior”). 
 134.  See id. (“In the 1930s, the passionately committed leaders of eugenics died or retired 
and no one stepped forward to replace them.”). Interestingly, some authors have contended that 
the Nazi’s use of American eugenics also led to its demise—and that is true, but that 
development did not occur until well after the 1930s. See LARGENT, supra note 116, at 139 
(“While it is evident that coerced sterilization continued well through the 1950s and that there is 
little evidence to support claims that the Holocaust turned Americans against compulsory 
sterilization after the war, the comparisons between the American eugenics movement and the 
policies of the Nazis finally wielded powerful rhetorical force in the last decades of the twentieth 
century. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, biologists and historians alike frequently linked 
coerced sterilization to the World War II atrocities.”); LOMBARDO, supra note 71, at 232 (noting 
the “common misconception” that Nazi practices led to the popular rejection of eugenics in the 
1930s); see also LARGENT, supra note 116, at 7 (noting that even as late as 1937, a Fortune 
magazine poll showed that sixty-six percent of respondents supported sterilization for mental 
defectives). 
 135.  See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text (discussing poor representation of Carrie 
Buck). 
 136.  Smith v. Wayne, 231 Mich. 409, 425 (1925); see also id. at 424:  
That feeble-mindedness is hereditary in certain cases, there can be no doubt. While a 
difference of opinion undoubtedly exists as to whether the condition of feeble-
mindedness in a particular person is such that it is reasonably certain his children 
will, or will not, be affected thereby, we are of the opinion that the weight of authority, 
as evidenced by scientific writings and reports, are convincing that it may be so 
determined. 
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Buck opinion.137 At the time, the notion that states could regulate in 
the interest of health and welfare as an exercise of their inherent 
police powers was so entrenched and conventional as to border on the  
banal.138 Buck was decided in the Lochner era, so the Justices were 
deeply divided on the constitutionality of economic regulation, but as 
to the propriety of regulation in the interest of the public welfare—and 
eugenic sterilization unquestionably fell into that category—the 
doctrine was not in doubt.139 
Even so, the enthusiasm with which the Supreme Court in 
Buck v. Bell affirmed Virginia’s sterilization statute suggested that 
the Justices approved of more than mere police power. Writing for the 
Court, Justice Holmes described the statute’s purpose as being “to 
prevent our being swamped with incompetence” and affirmed its 
legitimacy with the line, “It is better for all the world if, instead of 
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime or to let them starve 
for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit 
from continuing their kind.”140 Given that Justice Holmes had been a 
longtime supporter of eugenics,141 it would have been no surprise to 
see such language in one of his own opinions. But he was writing for 
virtually every member of the Supreme Court. Only Justice Butler 
dissented in Buck v. Bell, and he did not publish an opinion explaining 
why.142 
Perhaps there was nothing to say. The Supreme Court had 
undisputed facts of three generations of feeblemindedness, an 
admittedly valid legislative purpose, scrupulous compliance with 
procedural protections, decades of doctrine, and a cultural context in 
which eugenic interventions were viewed as progressive public policy 
backed by science. Under those circumstances, it would have been 
wildly hubristic, to the point of being almost unimaginable, for the 
 
 137.  See Nourse, supra note 71, at 112–13 (discussing votes of Court’s progressives, 
moderates, conservatives, and libertarians). 
 138.   See id. at 113 (“Oxymoronic as it may sound, Buck v. Bell’s implied police power 
analysis was banal as a doctrinal matter . . . .”). 
 139.  See id. at 112–14 (discussing how even the Lochner era’s libertarians, the so-called 
“four horsemen” who staunchly defended labor and property rights, followed “the standard 
doctrine of the day—rights were subject to the police power”). 
 140.  Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
 141.  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ideals and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1915): 
I believe that the wholesale social regeneration which so many now seem to expect, if 
it can be helped by conscious, coordinated human effort, cannot be affected 
appreciably by tinkering with the institution of property, but only by taking in hand 
life and trying to build a race. That would be my starting point for an idea for the law. 
 142.  Buck, 274 U.S. at 208 (noting only “Mr. Justice Butler dissents.”). 
         
1044 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:4:1019 
Justices in Buck to have ruled the other way.143  Even Justice Butler’s 
dissent was understood at the time as a reflection of his idiosyncratic 
Catholic views.144 
Today we view Buck v. Bell with derision and contempt. Labels 
like imbecile, feebleminded—even mentally retarded—are now 
considered gauche, or at least unenlightened.145 But it has been nearly 
ninety years since the decision; our sensibilities have dramatically 
changed. What Buck v. Bell teaches is not that the Supreme Court is a 
failure. It is that the Justices’ view of the law is inextricably bound by 
what Oliver Wendell Holmes described in 1881: “The felt necessities of 
the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of 
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges 
share with their fellow men.”146 
III. KOREMATSU V. UNITED STATES 
The Supreme Court’s 1944 decision in Korematsu v. United 
States,147 known for approving the internment of nearly 120,000 
Japanese Americans during World War II (two-thirds of whom were 
United States citizens) has been called “the Court’s greatest single 
failure . . . in all its history.”148 The hardship that internment imposed 
 
 143.  See Larson, supra note 115, at 124 (“[S]triking down Virginia’s sterilization statute in 
1927 would have constituted a blatant act of judicial activism bordering on hubris.”). 
 144.  See LOMBARDO, supra note 71, at 172 (noting that Justice Holmes told a colleague that 
Justice Butler was “afraid of the Church” and wagered, “I’ll lay you a bet the Church beats the 
law” (quoting DREW PEARSON & ROBERT S. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 117 (1936))); Larson, 
supra note 115, at 125 (“ ‘Butler knows this is good law,’ Holmes told a colleague before the 
ruling. ‘I wonder whether he will have the courage to vote with us in spite of his religion.’ ” 
(quoting WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 15 (1995))); see also Cynkar, supra note 73, at 1452 (“At 
the time of Buck v. Bell, though the Church had made no official pronouncement, it generally 
opposed sterilization. This view became the official position of the Church in 1930 when Pope 
Pius XI condemned sterilization in an encyclical on Christian marriage.”); LARGENT, supra note 
116, at 10 (“The immediate impact of Buck v. Bell was the crystallization of Catholic opposition 
to sterilization.”). 
 145.  See Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643 (2010) (striking the words “mental retardation” 
and “mentally retarded” from the U.S. Code and replacing them with descriptors using the term 
“intellectual disabilities”). 
 146.  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
 147.  323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 148.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 372; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 58 (“[T]he 
Court’s decision in Korematsu is regarded as one of its greatest embarrassments.”); Sherry, supra 
note 10, at 15 (“Korematsu and Hirabayashi upheld the most invidious racially discriminatory 
regime since slavery, forced thousands to abandon their homes and livelihoods, and encouraged 
an anti-Asian bigotry that has since dissipated but not disappeared.”); ERIC YAMAMOTO ET AL., 
RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 38 (2001) 
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was exceptionally severe physically, psychologically, and 
economically.149 And the dragnet it cast was based solely on Japanese 
ancestry—race.150 “The Court should have emphatically declared the 
government’s acts unconstitutional,” Chemerinsky writes.151 The vote 
in Korematsu was six-to-three, he argues, and if three Justices could 
see the injustice of a rule based on race, two more could have too.152 
Why three Justices dissented in Korematsu and what to make 
of those dissents are questions I take up shortly; first, however, I flesh 
out the context in which Korematsu was decided and the contours of 
the decision itself. Chemerinsky recognizes that “[t]he justices who 
approved evacuation of Japanese Americans in Korematsu had lived 
through the early days of World War II, when the outcome was 
uncertain and patriotism meant supporting the government’s war 
efforts.”153 And that much is true. But it misses what was actually 
driving the case—not patriotism or even the outcome of the war, but 
rather the threat of imminent invasion. Justice Black, author of 
Korematsu, had drafted a passage that did not appear in the final 
opinion but candidly captures the point: 
When an enemy Army imminently threatens a particular area of our country with 
invasion, the immediate responsibility for defense must necessarily rest on those who 
direct our armed forces. . . . It is enough for me that both Congress and the Commander-
in-Chief of the Army made a decision that the regulation as made was necessary to 
provide for the common defense in an area in which no man could say whether or when 
armed invaders would appear.154 
At issue in Korematsu was the judiciary’s role as to actions taken 
while under the threat of imminent invasion. To understand why the 
Justices decided it the way they did, one must first understand the 
larger sociopolitical context in which they experienced the case. 
 
(noting internment of nearly 120,000 persons of Japanese descent, over two-thirds of whom were 
American citizens).   
 149.  For a moving account of what the internment experience was like for Japanese 
Americans, see generally Frank H. Wu, Frank J. Battisti Memorial Lecture, Difficult Decisions 
During Wartime: A Letter From a Non-Alien in an Internment Camp to a Friend Back Home, 54 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1301 (2004); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 58 (noting that 
Japanese Americans lost $70 million in farms, $35 million in produce, and almost $500 million in 
annual income). 
 150.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 57 (“Korematsu is deeply objectionable because the 
government used ethnicity alone as the basis for predicting who was a threat to national security 
and who would remain free.”).    
 151.  Id. at 55.   
 152.  See id. at 58 (noting that “[t]his is not just hindsight” because several Justices 
dissented); id. at 89 (“It is too easy to make excuses for the justices and say that it is unrealistic 
to have expected them to do better. On the contrary, the Court could have stood up to pressure, 
and the powerful dissents could have been the positions of the majority.”). 
 153.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 293. 
 154.  ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 315 (1994) (quoting excerpt). 
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The story starts with Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on 
December 7, 1941, which knocked out the better part of the nation’s 
Pacific fleet.155 Eleven ships sunk, 165 planes destroyed on the 
ground, and 2,500 people dead, with over a 1,000 more injured.156 
America was in shock—there had been no declaration of war, no 
warning157—and Japan’s invasion of the Philippines just hours after 
Pearl Harbor, with the graphic reports of brutality that followed, only 
added to the public’s fear.158 
More was yet to come. Just three days after Pearl Harbor, 
Japan sank two British battleships, leaving the entire South Pacific 
virtually unprotected.159 A string of Japanese military victories 
followed, inducing panic that an attack on the nation’s vulnerable 
West Coast was next160—particularly in California, the self-described 
“number one war industry state.”161 Reports of Japanese planes 
reconnoitering parts of California resulted in a massive blackout, and 
 
 155.  See GEORGE MORGENSTERN, PEARL HARBOR: THE STORY OF THE SECRET WAR 51–67 
(1947) (discussing the decision to move the Pacific Fleet from San Francisco to Pearl Harbor to 
deter Japanese aggression in the Far East). 
 156.  See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 148, at 38 (discussing destruction from attack on 
Pearl Harbor); Wu, supra note 149, at 1309 (same).   
 157.  The fact that the attack occurred while United States was in diplomatic negotiations 
with Japan, and without a declaration of war or advance notice, led President Roosevelt to 
declare December 7, 1941 as “a date which will live in infamy” in a speech delivered to a joint 
session of congress the following day. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Pearl Harbor 
Address to Congress, in 87 CONG. REC. 9504-05 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1941); see also YAMAMOTO ET 
AL., supra note 148, at 97 (noting that Pearl Harbor attack shocked military leaders and the 
American public).   
 158.  See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 8 (1983) (noting “graphic reports of brutality by 
Japanese troops as they overran the Philippines shocked the American public”).  
 159.  See 3 WINSTON CHURCHILL, THE CHURCHILL WAR PAPERS: THE EVER WIDENING WAR 
1593–94 (2001): 
In all the war I never received a more direct shock . . . . As I turned and twisted in bed 
the full horror of the news sank upon me. There were no British or American capital 
ships in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific except the American survivors of Pearl 
Harbor, who were hastening back to California. Over all this vast expanse of waters 
Japan was supreme, and we everywhere were weak and naked.;  
DEL DICKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE 687 n.127 (2001) (“After Pearl Harbor, there 
was no effective American military presence in the Pacific, and military experts believed that a 
Japanese invasion of the West Coast was imminent.”).  
 160.  See Daniels, supra note 18, at 171 (“It was not just the disaster at Pearl Harbor, but 
the subsequent sequence of Japanese triumphs that triggered Executive Order 9066 seventy-four 
days later.”); Roger Daniels, Incarcerating Japanese Americans, OAH MAG. HIST., Spring 2002, 
at 19, 20 (“But the terrible war news of the winter of 1941-1942, in which seemingly invincible 
Imperial Japanese forces overran the Philippines, much of Southeast Asia, and seemed to 
threaten Australia and perhaps the United States itself, produced a state of panic, especially on 
the West Coast.”).   
 161.  Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, Brown, 
and a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. REV. 73, 108 n.183 (1998) (quoting Earl Warren’s 
1942 gubernatorial campaign press release).    
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although those reports turned out to be false,162 reports of Japanese 
submarines off the West Coast were true. Between December 17 and 
23, Japanese subs attacked a number of U.S. merchant ships, sinking 
two tankers and damaging a freighter along the Pacific coast.163 The 
nation braced itself for attack along its western border, which was 
widely viewed to be imminent.164 
Given the nation’s long tradition of anti-Asian sentiment 
(particularly on the West Coast), the attack on Pearl Harbor alone 
may have led to a spike in animus against Japanese Americans,165 but 
exacerbating racial tensions was the strong suspicion that Japanese 
Americans had been involved in the attack. The FBI had broken into 
the Japanese consulate in Los Angeles earlier in 1941 and had 
recovered extensive information compromising Japan’s West Coast 
espionage network.166 In the immediate wake of Pearl Harbor, federal 
agents had acted on that information, arresting over 2,000 Japanese 
Americans believed to have enemy loyalty.167 Rumors spread that the 
round-up was based on evidence of aiders and abettors in the Pearl 
Harbor strike, and those rumors gained traction when the Secretary of 
the Navy toured Pearl Harbor and stated that espionage had played a 
part.168 Newspapers sensationalized the comment with headlines that 
 
 162.  See IRONS, supra note 158, at 26.  
 163.  See id. at 27.   
 164.  See id. at 26 (noting that civilians and military “shared a severe case of Pearl Harbor 
panic” and that “[f]ears of an imminent Japanese attack on the West Coast swept through nearly 
all segments of the public in the weeks that followed Pearl Harbor”).     
 165.  See Cho, supra note 161, at 86–88 (discussing “California’s long tradition of anti-Asian 
legislation, violence and intolerance”); Harvey Gee, Civil Liberties, National Security, and the 
Japanese American Internment, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 771, 776–77 (2005): 
“Even before the attacks on Pearl Harbor, Japanese immigrants and their American-
born children endured great hardship in this country because they were perceived as 
economic threats. As such, they were subjected to official discrimination and political 
protest. Through legislation, boycotts, school segregation, and propaganda, the 
Japanese faced exclusion driven by fear and hostility. The flames of anti-Japanese 
animus were further fueled by the bombing of Pearl Harbor. 
 166.  See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 148, at 96–97 (discussing counterespionage break-in). 
For a fascinating account, see generally Pedro Loureiro, The Imperial Japanese Navy and 
Espionage: The Itaru Tachibana Case, 3 INT’L J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 105–21 
(1989); and FRANCIS MACDONNELL, INSIDIOUS FOES: THE AXIS FIFTH COLUMN AND THE 
AMERICAN HOME FRONT 83–86 (1995).  
 167.  See IRONS, supra note 158, at 19 (discussing roundup); YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 
148, at 96–97 (discussing same in the relation to prior counterespionage break-in). It was the fact 
that the FBI had fresh intelligence on disloyal Japanese Americans from the break-in and had 
arrested over 2000 people that created the government’s internal disagreement over the 
necessity of internment. See id. at 96–97 (“After these arrests, military intelligence and the FBI 
disagreed about how much espionage threat remained.”).  
 168.  See IRONS, supra note 158, at 19 (“ ‘A great man hunt was underway last night in 
Southern California,’ the Los Angeles Times reported on December 8, as federal agents ‘sought 
300 alien Japanese suspected of subversive activities.’ ”); YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 148, at 38 
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read “Secretary of Navy Blames Fifth Columnists for Raid” and “Fifth 
Column Treachery Told,”169 setting off an avalanche of reports by 
nervous citizens of “signaling” coming from the California coastline.170 
Cementing suspicions was the January 1942 report of the Roberts 
Commission—chaired by Justice Owen Roberts at the behest of 
President Roosevelt to investigate the attack on Pearl Harbor—which 
likewise concluded that espionage had been a contributing factor in 
the attack.171 
That leaves two additional reasons Japanese Americans were 
viewed as suspect. One was California Attorney General Earl 
Warren’s mapping project. Just after the release of the Roberts 
Commission Report, Warren met with county officials to collect 
information about Japanese American residential patterns.172  What 
he found was an unusual clustering of settlements near areas of 
strategic importance such as power plants, airports, freight yards, 
factories, and other industrial areas.173 Ignoring the fact that past 
discrimination against Japanese Americans often made marginal 
tracts near these areas their only available housing option, Warren 
saw in the settlement patterns an opportunity for large scale 
sabotage.174 He shared his project with military leaders, syndicated 
columnists, and eventually Congress, and it is thought to have played 
 
(discussing roundup in the immediate wake of Pearl Harbor and noting, “Soon, it became widely 
believed that Pearl Harbor succeeded because of Japanese American sabotage”); Cho, supra note 
161, at 90 (“Two days after the December 7, 1941, Pearl Harbor attack, Secretary of the Navy 
Frank Knox toured the devastated site and put into circulation unfounded rumors that Japanese 
Hawaiian saboteurs were responsible for ‘the most effective fifth-column work that’s come out of 
this war.’ ”).   
 169.  Cho, supra note 161, at 90–91; see also Fifth Column, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fifth%20column (last visited Mar. 16, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/YR64-AYN9] (defining fifth column as “a group of secret sympathizers or 
supporters of an enemy that engage in espionage or sabotage within defense lines or national 
borders”). 
 170.  See IRONS, supra note 158, at 27 (discussing point and noting military’s receipt of 
“hundreds of reports nightly of signal lights visible from the coast”). 
 171.  See id. at 40 (discussing report’s findings and noting that the report “inflamed the 
mainland press and spurred the incipient campaign for the mass evacuation of Japanese 
Americans from the West Coast”); Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr., The Weintraub Lecture: Judicial 
Decision Making and the External Environment, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 181, 183–84 (1991) 
(discussing the Roberts Commission report and noting that its allegation that civilians were 
involved with the espionage effort “fueled the fire of race hate beyond repair”). Later 
investigation would reveal that espionage was involved in the Pearl Harbor attack, but the main 
culprit was a Japanese vice consul in Hawaii. For that account, see GORDON PRANGE, AT DAWN 
WE SLEPT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF PEARL HARBOR (1981) (detailing espionage of Takeo 
Yoshikawa and its role in Pearl Harbor attack). 
 172.  See Cho, supra note 161, at 92–93.   
 173.  See id. at 93–94.   
 174.  See id. at 94–98.   
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a part in President Roosevelt’s decisionmaking process.175 In the end, 
Warren’s mapping project and influence would earn him the dubious 
distinction of being “the single most powerful voice” for the internment 
decision.176 
The second reason that Japanese Americans were suspect in 
the wake of Pearl Harbor was their Japanese ancestry itself. Japanese 
Americans were known as a tight-knit, largely unassimilated group, 
and many believed that their past mistreatment gave them good 
reason to be disloyal.177 The Niihau incident at Pearl Harbor, in which 
Japanese Hawaiians had helped a downed Japanese zero pilot 
overcome his captors and secure weapons,178 likewise gave credence to 
the view that “race, culture, custom and religion” might outweigh 
American citizenship in determining loyalty—especially since many 
Japanese American citizens were considered Japanese citizens too.179 
It was racist, blatantly so, and at times infused with clear anti-Asian 
 
 175.  See id. at 99–105 (discussing the significance of Warren’s mapping project). The project 
ultimately found its way to the Supreme Court. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 
105 (1943) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The presence of many thousands of aliens and citizens of 
Japanese ancestry in or near to the key points along that coast line aroused special concern in 
those charged with the defense of the country.”). 
 176.  FRANK F. CHUMAN, THE BAMBOO PEOPLE: THE LAW AND JAPANESE-AMERICANS 151 
(1981); see also Cho, supra note 161, at 89–90 (quoting Chuman and other scholars who claim 
Warren was “one of the individuals most responsible for bringing the relocation program into 
being” and that “probably more than any single person” Earl Warren influenced the internment 
decision). 
 177.  See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 96: 
There is support for the view that social, economic and political conditions which have 
prevailed since the close of the last century, when the Japanese began to come to this 
country in substantial numbers, have intensified their solidarity and have in large 
measure prevented their assimilation as an integral part of the white population.  
The government made this argument in its brief, stating:  
The reaction of the Japanese to their lack of assimilation and to their treatment is a 
question which of course does not admit of any precise answer. It is entirely possible 
that an unknown number of the Japanese may lack to some extent a feeling of loyalty 
toward the United States as a result of their treatment, and may feel a consequent tie 
to Japan . . . . 
YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 148, at 123.   
 178.  See ALLAN BEEKMAN, THE NIIHAU INCIDENT: THE TRUE STORY OF THE JAPANESE 
FIGHTER PILOT WHO, AFTER THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK, CRASH-LANDED ON THE HAWAIIAN 
ISLAND OF NIIHAU AND TERRORIZED THE RESIDENTS (1982) (discussing the Niihau Incident, which 
was cited in General DeWitt’s final report recommending internment).   
 179.  Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 237 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Under Japan’s dual citizenship 
doctrine, children born to Japanese nationals were citizens of Japan too. The military relied on 
this doctrine as part of its justification for internment, although as Justice Murphy noted in his 
Korematsu dissent, that doctrine had been modified and was generally no longer in play. See id. 
at 237–38 (Murphy, J., dissenting).  
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animus.180 But these fears, too, were part of the larger sociopolitical 
context of the case. 
Fear, vulnerability, suspicion of espionage, race—these factors 
combined in early 1942 to create a torrent of calls for the removal of 
Japanese Americans from the West Coast as a preventive measure. 
The popular press called for it.181 The governors of California, Oregon, 
and Washington called for it too, as did other West Coast 
politicians.182 Indeed, California Attorney General Earl Warren’s part 
in the internment decision—his mapping project—was a prominent 
part of the gubernatorial campaign that would sweep him into office in 
the fall of 1942.183 General John DeWitt, head of the Western Defense 
Command responsible for defending the Pacific Coast, called for 
internment too—partly in response to Pearl Harbor panic, partly in 
response to political lobbying, and partly in response to the Roberts 
Commission report’s finding that lax readiness played a role at Pearl 
Harbor, a lapse he felt intense pressure to prevent from happening 
again.184 
In February 1942, less than ninety days after the Pearl Harbor 
attack, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, authorizing 
the military to designate specified areas as military zones “from which 
any or all persons may be excluded” and to impose restrictions in 
those areas as appropriate.185 Congress followed the next month with 
Public Law 503, which criminalized failure to follow military orders in 
those zones, passing the measure by a voice vote—unanimously in the 
 
 180.  See Greenaway, supra note 171, at 184 (quoting General Dewitt as saying to a 
congressional committee, “A Jap’s a Jap; it makes no difference whether he’s an American citizen 
or not. There is no way to determine his loyalty”). 
 181.  See IRONS, supra note 158, at 7 (noting “demands for the removal of Japanese 
Americans from the West Coast” in the press and quoting the Los Angeles Times as 
editorializing, “the rigors of war demand proper detention of Japanese and their immediate 
removal from the most acute danger spots”); id. (“Flowing toward the White House through the 
tributaries of public opinion, these currents of concern about the Japanese Americans began as a 
trickle and ended as a torrent.”); YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 148, at 99 (noting that prominent 
newspaper journalists and syndicated columnists supported internment); Daniels, supra note 18, 
at 162 (quoting New York Times article stating “There appeared last week ample proof to 
substantiate Pacific Coast fears.”).  
 182.  See Greenaway, supra note 171, at 184; see also IRONS, supra note 158, at 268–69 
(noting pressure from “West Coast politicians” including “the West Coast congressional 
delegation”).  
 183.  See Cho, supra note 161, at 105–11 (discussing role of mapping project in Warren’s 
1942 gubernatorial campaign and quoting from campaign ads to illustrate point).  
 184.  See IRONS, supra note 158, at 26–27, 268; YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 148, at 99.   
 185.  Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942) (authorizing the Secretary of 
War to prescribe military areas); see also IRONS, supra note 158, at 7 (discussing executive 
order).   
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Senate.186 With that and a few derivative orders, internment began.187 
General DeWitt declared the entire West Coast to be a theatre of 
operations under military control, imposing a curfew on Japanese 
Americans in March and excluding them from the area (by interning 
them in another) in May.188 The public supported the move.189 
Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of the sociopolitical 
context of 1942 is the dearth of public criticism of internment, even 
among those one would expect to express a contrary view.190 The 
Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) supported internment, 
encouraging its members to comply and declining to assist those who 
did not.191 The Communist Party also supported internment and 
instructed its members to comply, despite its commitment to making 
democracy look bad by defending the rights of oppressed minorities, as 
it had famously done in the Scottsboro Boys case a decade earlier.192 
Even the ACLU was deeply split on the issue, with the national board 
ultimately deciding that local ACLU branches were “not free to 
 
 186.  See An Act of March 21, 1942 to Provide a Penalty for Violation of Restrictions or 
Orders with Respect to Persons Entering, Remaining in, Leaving, or Committing Any Act in 
Military Areas or Zones, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173 (1942); see also Klarman, supra note 
23, at 29 (noting that congressional authority was granted by a voice vote after perfunctory 
debate); Daniels, supra note 160, at 20 (noting that the measure passed unanimously in the 
Senate, although it was considered one of the “sloppiest” laws “read or seen anywhere”). 
 187.  See IRONS, supra note 158, at 321 (noting that Congress also appropriated funds for 
relocation after passing Public Law 503); Greenaway, supra note 171, at 185 (discussing second 
executive order, Executive Order 9102, establishing the War Relocation Authority).  
 188.  See DICKSON, supra note 159, at 687; IRONS, supra note 158, at 6; YAMAMOTO ET AL., 
supra note 148, at 101, 104.  
 189.  Barry Friedman writes: 
Gallup did remarkably little polling on the question [of internment], which is itself 
telling of how little most people really seemed to care what was going on. But the 
answers Gallup did elicit are a little chilling. In 1942, Gallup asked whether those 
interned inland should be allowed to return at the end of the hostilities. By a 48-34 
margin, the answer was no. 
Friedman goes on to say that in follow-up questions about what should happen to the interned 
Japanese Americans, “the most popular responses advocated throwing them out of the country or 
sending them back to Japan, and 3.8 percent indicated they should just be killed.” FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 6, at 373; see also Robert H. Jackson, Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 
BUFF. L. REV. 103, 115 (1951) (describing internment as “certainly the popular view at the time”).  
 190.  See Daniels, supra note 18, at 162 (“It is notorious that virtually no protest was heard 
against the mass violation of the civil liberties of Japanese Americans during the war, either 
from the ethnic community before it was sent to camp or from the larger public then and 
later. . . . both the press and those organizations that had been the traditional defenders of the 
civil liberties of minorities were silent.”). Even the defendant in the companion case to 
Hirabayashi, when asked what he would do if he were in charge, answered, “I feel that I would 
intern all Japanese aliens and Japanese citizens.” IRONS, supra note 158, at 140 (quoting Yasui). 
 191.  See IRONS, supra note 158, at 79–81 (discussing position of JACL); YAMAMOTO ET AL., 
supra note 148, at 129 (same).   
 192.  See Daniels, supra note 18, at 163 (noting that the communist party “supported mass 
incarceration and instructed its few Japanese American members to go willingly to the camps”). 
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sponsor cases in which the position is taken that the government has 
no constitutional right to remove citizens from military areas.”193 As 
important as civil liberties were, the exigencies of war took 
precedence.194 
Against this backdrop, one would think that the Supreme 
Court would have readily approved the military’s orders—and it did in 
two curfew cases decided in 1943, when the outcome of the war was 
still very much in doubt.195 In Hirabayashi v. United States and the 
companion case of Yasui v. United States, the Justices unanimously 
rejected a constitutional challenge to military curfew restrictions 
applicable only to Japanese Americans.196 While recognizing that 
“distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by 
their very nature odious,” the Court cited “the danger of espionage and 
sabotage in a time of war and of threatened invasion” as justification 
for sustaining the race-based restriction.197 Even so, the Justices 
strained to decide as little as they could; the cases were brought as 
challenges to the military’s internment order, but the Court affirmed 
on the ancillary curfew violations instead.198 
 
 193.  IRONS, supra note 158, at 130 (quoting national ACLU); see also id. at ix, 128–30, 360–
61 (discussing the “fierce internal battle within the ACLU” pitting a local California branch 
against the ACLU’s national board, which voted not to challenge constitutionality of 
internment); Klarman, supra note 23, at 29 (“Even the American Civil Liberties Union was 
bitterly divided over the constitutionality of the military exclusion order, ultimately concluding 
that the demands of national security during wartime could justify exclusion of citizens from a 
military zone.”). Ultimately, the ACLU filed an amicus brief in Korematsu challenging 
internment after several of its members connected with two Department of Justice attorneys 
who were likewise conflicted over the internment decision. For the saga, see IRONS, supra note 
158, at 130–32, 186–95 (discussing the ACLU’s positioning in the Japanese American cases after 
having declined direct representation). 
 194.  See IRONS, supra note 158, at 133–34 (asking: 
What factors led the only independent organization dedicated to defending the rights 
of racial and political minorities to withhold support from those who challenged the 
uprooting of an entire racial group from its homes? . . . Why did the ACLU by a 2-to-1 
margin refuse to sanction direct challenges to the President’s power to authorize the 
military orders directed at Japanese Americans? 
and answering with a discussion of how wartime concerns trumped civil liberties). 
 195.  See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 148, at 163 (“When the early pair of cases 
(Hirabayashi and Yasui) were considered by the Supreme Court in 1943, fighting in the Pacific 
was fierce and U.S. success was by no means assured.”). 
 196.  Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 109–14 (1943); Yasui v. United States, 320 
U.S. 115, 117 (1943).   
 197.  Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100. 
 198.  See IRONS, supra note 158, at 231–50 (discussing conference and other discussions 
among the Justices in Hirabayashi to rule as narrowly as possible); Greenaway, supra note 171, 
at 185 (discussing Hirabayashi’s intent to be a test case against internment and how he came to 
be charged with curfew violations as well, which ultimately formed the basis for the Court’s 
decision).   
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In fairness, the sociopolitical context had changed substantially 
by the time the Supreme Court decided Korematsu v. United States 
and its companion case, Ex Parte Endo, in December 1944.199 In the 
fifteen months after Hirabayashi, the war had shifted strongly in the 
allied forces’ favor, with decisive battlefield victories in both the 
Pacific and in Europe.200 West Coast fears of a Japanese invasion had 
largely faded and the nation was more confident about World War II’s 
outcome.201 Indeed, by the summer of 1944, high level cabinet debates 
over when to end internment were already well underway.202 
Yet the fear that gripped the nation in the wake of Pearl 
Harbor, and the urgency it created for protective measures in 
response, were still fresh in the Justices’ minds. “The need for action 
was great, and time was short,” the Supreme Court in Korematsu 
wrote.203 Invasion appeared to be imminent, the military had 
concluded that mass internment was necessary, and the President and 
Congress had agreed. For a majority of the Justices, that was 
enough.204 As the last line of the majority’s opinion put the point, “We 
cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—
now say that, at that time, these actions were unjustified.”205 The 
moment of crisis had passed, but the Justices remembered it vividly. 
More to the point, they refused to invalidate a racial classification in 
hindsight that a unanimous bench had held valid when the danger 
was still acute. 
 
 199.  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).  
 200.  See IRONS, supra note 158, at 319–20: 
Both in the Pacific and Europe, the tides of war had shifted dramatically in the fifteen 
months since the Court had decided the Hirabayashi and Yasui cases. Fresh from 
bloody but decisive victories in the Mariana Islands, American troops were poised to 
return General Douglas MacArthur to the Philippines. Allied troops in Europe flowed 
through their beachhead in Normandy in pursuit of the retreating Germans, while 
Soviet soldiers battled their way toward Berlin. 
 201.  See DICKSON, supra note 159, at 693; YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 148, at 163. 
 202.  See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 148, at 174; see also IRONS, supra note 158, at 269 
(noting that the President decided not to end internment in summer of 1944, despite advice from 
military advisors that it was no longer necessary, because he wanted a partisan advantage in the 
1944 elections, but that these were “behind-the-scenes” discussions of which the litigants were 
unaware).  
 203.  Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223–24. 
 204.  See id. at 218–19: 
We cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did not have ground 
for believing that, in a critical hour, such [disloyal] persons could not readily be 
isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national defense 
and safety which demanded that prompt and adequate measures be taken to guard 
against it. 
 205.  Id. at 224. 
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Thus far, I have taken an external view of Korematsu, 
contextualizing the case to expose the constraint inherent in the 
larger socioeconomic context in which it was decided. Yet equally 
revealing is the insight that comes from an internal view of the 
Justices’ decisionmaking in the case. From the outside looking in, the 
Justices refused to strike down internment. From the inside looking 
out, it was clear they did not like what they saw. 
Unlike the Justices in Plessy and Buck, who had no hesitation 
rejecting the rights claims at issue in those cases, the Justices in 
Korematsu were anguished.206 They no more wanted to validate 
Japanese American internment than to invalidate it, and so they did 
neither, ducking the constitutionality of internment altogether. This 
they accomplished by construing the military’s exclusion order as 
merely an order not to be someplace—the West Coast theatre of 
operations—rather than as an order to be someplace else.207 In reality, 
the opposite was true. The military’s exclusion order did not merely 
order exclusion; it effectuated exclusion by ordering Japanese 
Americans to report to designated assembly centers, where they were 
placed under guard and then moved to internment camps.208  
The difference mattered. Under the majority’s narrow 
construction of the case, Korematsu was not so different from 
Hirabayashi—indeed, that is what the Supreme Court’s opinion 
said.209 To be sure, forcing Japanese Americans to leave an area was 
more extreme than enforcing a curfew, but both were of a completely 
different ilk than detaining Japanese Americans in internment camps 
for an indeterminate period of time. Validating internment was, from 
 
 206.  For the saga of the Justices’ decisionmaking in the case, see IRONS, supra note 158, at 
320–41. 
 207.  See id. at 223 (“[W]e are dealing specifically with nothing but an exclusion order.”); see 
also Gee, supra note 165, at 776 (noting that the Supreme Court in Korematsu managed to evade 
the most basic question—whether internment was constitutional).   
 208.  The majority’s opinion in Korematsu conceded as much. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 221 
(noting that the military exclusion order stated that evacuation would be “effected by assembling 
together and placing under guard all those of Japanese ancestry at central points, designated as 
‘assembly centers’ in order to insure the orderly evacuation and resettlement of Japanese . . . ”); 
id. at 223 (“Korematsu was under compulsion to leave the area not as he would choose, but via 
an Assembly Center.”); see also IRONS, supra note 158, at 320 (“As worded, the exclusion orders 
themselves necessarily led to detention for some period of time in the relocation centers.”). 
 209.  See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219 (“It was because we could not reject the finding of the 
military authorities that it was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the 
disloyal from the loyal that we sustained the validity of the curfew order as applying to the whole 
group. In the instant case, temporary exclusion of the entire group was rested by the military on 
the same ground.”); see also IRONS, supra note 158, at 322 (quoting Chief Justice Stone in 
conference as reasoning, “If you can do it for curfew you can do it for exclusion.”). 
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the start, something the Justices in Korematsu were simply not 
inclined to do.210 
Yet even with the majority’s exceedingly narrow construction of 
the case, the Justices struggled. The vote in Korematsu was six-to-
three, but it began as five-to-four, and the vote of one of the five 
majority Justices, Justice Rutledge, was tentative.211 Justice Roberts 
dissented because he thought the issues of exclusion and internment 
were inseparable.212 Justice Jackson dissented because he thought the 
Supreme Court should neither enjoin the exclusion order nor assist in 
its enforcement.213 And Justice Murphy dissented because he thought 
the order was racist through and through.214 Justice Douglas almost 
dissented for the same reason as Justice Roberts—he thought the 
majority’s attempt to separate exclusion from internment was 
untenable—but his view was that the threat of invasion justified both, 
so his position was more of a concurrence from the start.215 
Chemerinsky claims that because three Justices dissented in 
Korematsu, others could have, and should have, voted to strike down 
the military’s order too. But that puts more weight on the dissents 
than they can bear, and misses how far the majority in Korematsu 
stretched. Justice Jackson was not a vote to strike down internment; 
his position was limited to not lending the Supreme Court’s 
imprimatur to its enforcement.216 Justice Roberts also wrote a 
qualified dissent, stating that if the exclusion order had been as the 
majority had claimed, he “might agree” with its disposition of the 
case.217 Only Justice Murphy was strident in his view of the 
 
 210.  See IRONS, supra note 158, at 320–23 (discussing Justices’ intent from the start to 
narrowly construe the case and their subsequent struggle to do so).     
 211.  See id. at 332–39 (discussing original vote in Korematsu); DICKSON, supra note 159, at 
690 (quoting Justice Rutledge as stating in conference, “I had to swallow Hirabayashi. I didn’t 
like it . . . . I vote to affirm tentatively.”); Justice Rutledge’s biographer claimed that the 
Japanese internment cases caused the Justice so much anguish that they were one of the 
problems “which pushed Wiley Rutledge along the path to his premature grave.” YAMAMOTO ET 
AL., supra note 148, at 64.   
 212.  See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 225–33 (Roberts, J., dissenting).  
 213.  See id. at 242–48 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 214.  See id. at 233–42 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 215.  See IRONS, supra note 158, at 332–39 (discussing Justice Douglas’s original vote and 
rationale, as well as his decision to switch sides, ultimately voting with the majority). 
 216.  See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 247–48 (Jackson, J., dissenting): 
I should hold that a civil court cannot be made to enforce an order which violates 
constitutional limitations even if it is a reasonable exercise of military authority. . . . I 
do not suggest that the courts should have attempted to interfere with the Army in 
carrying out its task. But I do not think they may be asked to execute a military 
expedient that has no place in law under the Constitution. 
 217.  See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 231 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s 
artificially narrow construction of the exclusion order “is a substitution of a hypothetical case for 
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unconstitutionality of the order based on race—but even his vote can 
carry only so much weight given his vote to uphold the military’s race-
based order in Hirabayashi the year before.218  
In short, what is striking about Korematsu is not its dissents, 
but rather how far the Justices in the majority stretched to not uphold 
internment, knowing that they were not about to strike it down. The 
Justices in the majority did judicial backflips to avoid ruling on the 
issue; indeed, their strained analysis cost them one vote, almost cost 
them another, and made drafting the opinion in the case an 
exceedingly difficult and protracted task.219 Ironically, the case 
condemned for upholding Japanese American internment never 
actually ruled on it at all. 
But what Korematsu did not do, its companion case of Ex parte 
Endo220 did—at least in part. Endo was a habeas corpus petition that 
challenged the continued internment of a citizen who had 
subsequently passed the government’s loyalty screening. As in 
Korematsu, the Justices refused to rule on the constitutionality of 
internment itself, but as to Endo—and the 70,000-some others like her 
still in internment camps221—they had little problem resolving the 
case. For a unanimous Court, the Endo opinion stated: 
We are of the view that Misueye Endo should be given her liberty. In reaching that 
conclusion, we do not come to the underlying constitutional issues which have been 
argued. For we conclude that, whatever power the War Relocation Authority may have 
to detain other classes of citizens, it has no authority to subject citizens who are 
concededly loyal to its leave procedure.222 
 
the case actually before court” and adding “I might agree with the court’s disposition of the 
hypothetical case.”). 
 218.  See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 109–14 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring). 
Interestingly, even Justice Murphy conceded that the fear of imminent invasion in early 1942 
justified reasonable military means to counter the danger; he just disagreed that what the 
military did was reasonable. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“It must 
be conceded that the military and naval situation in the spring of 1942 was such as to generate a 
very real fear of invasion of the Pacific Coast, accompanied by fears of sabotage and espionage in 
that area. The military command was therefore justified in adopting all reasonable means 
necessary to combat these dangers.”) 
 219.  See IRONS, supra note 158, at 325–41 (discussing Justices’ struggle to write the opinion 
in Korematsu). The process was so difficult that at one point, dissenting Justice Murphy sent a 
note to his clerk stating, “The Court has blown up on the Jap case—just as I expected it would.” 
Id. at 332. 
 220.  323 U.S. 283 (1944). 
 221.  See IRONS, supra note 158, at 323 (noting that as defined, the narrow issue in 
Korematsu was important “only as a matter of legal debate” because removal had already 
occurred, but that the Court’s resolution of Endo “would affect not only Mitsuye Endo but some 
70,000 other Japanese Americans still confined in relocation centers”).  
 222.  Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. at 297; see also IRONS, supra note 158, at 341–42 (noting that 
in drafting the opinion in Endo, Justice Douglas “matched Black in his determination to evade 
the question of detention”).  
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The government barely put up a fight.223 Its justification for 
internment had been the inability to quickly determine Japanese 
American loyalty. Once that determination had been made, the 
justification for internment was gone. 
Because the military’s loyalty screening in the internment 
camps was nearly complete by the fall of 1944, Endo effectively ended 
internment.224 But it was not alone in doing so. Shortly after the 
November 1944 election (and well after the Justices’ mid-October 
conference discussions and vote in Endo), the government decided to 
end internment too.225 The War Authority’s announcement came 
December 17, 1944.226 The Supreme Court’s announcement of Endo 
came the next day. 
Just one more point remains to be made, and it concerns a 
late—and at the time gratuitous—addition to the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Korematsu. In the final draft of the Court’s opinion, Justice 
Black added a paragraph stating that “all legal restrictions which 
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately 
suspect” and subject to “the most rigid scrutiny.”227 It was likely in 
response to Justice Murphy’s stinging dissent,228 and was not load-
bearing in the Court’s analysis. Indeed, it was awkwardly placed in 
the midst of the Court’s chronology of the case and then ignored for 
the remainder of the opinion.229 But it made a statement, and the 
statement stuck. Today, Korematsu is (ironically) the case to cite for 
the birth of the strict scrutiny standard of review for race 
classifications.230 Indeed, the NAACP in Brown v. Board of 
Education231 cited Korematsu for the proposition that de jure 
 
 223.  See IRONS, supra note 158, at 318–19, 342 (detailing portions of oral argument and 
noting that the government’s “half-hearted defense” of internment in Endo, where loyalty had 
been determined, made the outcome “almost inevitable”).  
 224.  Those who failed the loyalty screening could be held on an individual basis, and those 
who passed (like Endo) had to be freed. See id. at 269. 
 225.  See id. at 345. 
 226.  See id. 
 227.  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).  
 228.  See id. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“I dissent, therefore, from this legalization of 
racism.”).  
 229.  See id. at 216; see also IRONS, supra note 158, at 340 (“The odd placement of this 
paragraph in the opinion—stuck in the middle of the chronology of the case—suggests that Black 
inserted it at the last minute, more as window dressing than as a plank in the opinion’s 
foundation.”).  
 230.  See Gee, supra note 165, at 778; DICKSON, supra note 159, at 692. For an argument 
that “the most rigid scrutiny” in Korematsu is not the same as strict scrutiny, at least as applied 
today, see Richard Fallon, Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267 (2007).  
 231.  347 U.S. 483 (1954) (invalidating de jure segregation in public schools). 
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segregation required more than reasonableness review, as had been 
applied in Plessy.232 
Today the internment of Japanese Americans during World 
War II is widely viewed as one of our nation’s most regrettable 
mistakes.233 But in the wake of Pearl Harbor, when an attack on the 
West Coast was viewed as imminent, there were few dissenters. And 
there is little reason to think the Supreme Court could have played 
that role—even the dissenters in Korematsu unanimously approved 
Hirabayashi’s race-based restriction in 1943. What is remarkable 
about Korematsu and its overlooked companion case of Endo is not 
what the Justices failed to do, but rather what they did. The Supreme 
Court was not about to tell the war-making branches that they could 
not do what they thought necessary for the common defense at the 
outbreak of war, but it refused to sanction the internment decision 
itself, freed those who remained interned even after their loyalty had 
been established, and planted the seeds for more exacting judicial 
review. In light of the rhetoric of failure that conventionally 
characterizes the case, it is striking just how sensitive to civil liberties 
the Supreme Court in Korematsu actually was. 
Taken together, Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu paint a picture of 
the Supreme Court that differs dramatically from Chemerinsky’s 
portrayal. The question then becomes what we can learn from these 
reconstructed narratives. To that question, and a story of Supreme 
Court success, the discussion turns next. 
IV. WHAT TO MAKE OF THREE SUPREME COURT “FAILURES” 
Thus far, I have considered the historical context of Plessy, 
Buck, and Korematsu individually. In this Part, I turn to lessons 
learned from the cases when considered together. The first, and most 
obvious, is that historical context matters, although the point requires 
more nuance than might appear at first blush. I then turn from 
consideration of the point on a macro level to consideration of the 
 
 232.  See DICKSON, supra note 159, at 691–92 n.137 (explaining how the NAACP in Brown v. 
Board of Education argued that Korematsu “raised the bar for racial classifications” from 
reasonableness to strict scrutiny). 
 233.  See Gee, supra note 165, at 786–87 (discussing the redress movement); Greenaway, 
supra note 171, at 190–91 (discussing Congressional apology and restitution in 1988, and 
quoting Earl Warren as saying, “I have since deeply regretted the removal order and my own 
testimony advocating it . . . .”). We now know that there was conflicting evidence as to whether 
internment was necessary in the first place, but the government in Korematsu suppressed that 
information, altered reports, and literally burned earlier versions of those documents so the 
Supreme Court (and public) would never know. For a fascinating account, see IRONS, supra note 
158, at 186–218. 
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point on a micro level, using Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu to illustrate 
three ways that culture can constrain the Justices’ proclivity to 
protect. I close with an examination of the premise that undergirds 
the rhetoric of failure, and locate its origin in the Supreme Court 
itself. In various ways, I argue, the very notion of Supreme Court 
“failures” reveals a larger, and largely untold, story of Supreme Court 
success. 
A. Historical Context Matters 
Chemerinsky’s Case Against the Supreme Court is replete with 
the word “today.”234 “I will focus especially on examples . . . where 
virtually everyone today—liberal and conservatives alike—can agree 
that the Court was wrong,” Chemerinsky writes.235 And at least with 
regard to cases like Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu, he makes good on 
that promise. No one thinks of these cases as representing a morally 
acceptable outcome today—but the Supreme Court did not decide 
these cases today. The Court decided them in three completely 
different historical contexts, each with its own set of cultural 
constraints. Here, then, is the first (and most obvious) lesson that 
Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu teach: Historical context matters. 
Chemerinsky concedes that the Justices live in society and are 
thus likely to reflect its values,236 but views this recognition as an all 
too easy excuse.237 “It is quite justifiable to have expected the Court to 
do better in all these areas,” he writes.238 “The Supreme Court is there 
 
 234.  See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 65 (“Without doubt, any court today would 
regard it as expression protected by the very core of the First Amendment.”); id. at 111 (“Unlike 
the decisions from the 1890s to 1936, which have few defenders today . . . .”); id. at 127 (“[N]o one 
today is likely to criticize the holding in Brown or the results in the other decisions declaring 
segregation unconstitutional. These cases dramatically changed society and are a powerful 
example of what the Court exists to accomplish.”); id. at 136 (“Today, these decisions applying 
the Bill of Rights to state and local governments seem unassailable and are hardly criticized.”); 
id. at 334 (“I do not expect that many today, even staunch conservatives, would defend the 
Supreme Court’s decisions about slavery in the nineteenth century . . . .”). 
 235.  Id. at 6. 
 236.  See id. at 293: 
Simply put, why has the Supreme Court failed so often at times when it has been 
most needed? There is no single or easy answer to these questions. Of course, a part of 
the answer is that the justices live in society and thus are likely to reflect its attitudes 
and values at any point in time. 
 237.   See id. at 89 (“It is too easy to make excuses for the justices and say that it is 
unrealistic to have expected them to do better.”). 
 238.  Id. at 337; see also id. at 60 (“We can and should expect more from the Court than what 
it has historically done to enforce the Constitution . . . .”). 
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to enforce the limits of the Constitution, and the justices are given life 
tenure to help insulate them from majoritarian pressures.”239 
But the majoritarian pressures at work in cases like Plessy, 
Buck, and Korematsu are not the kind that job security can offset. Life 
tenure cannot remove the Justices from the cultural context in which 
they operate. It cannot insulate them from values of the society in 
which they live. When the Justices decide cases, they do so against a 
backdrop of cultural norms that naturally inform their views of what 
is, and is not, proper in the realm of constitutional interpretation. To 
expect otherwise—to think that the Justices could somehow extricate 
themselves from the influence of their social environment—is to ask 
for more than they (or anyone else) can reasonably do. 
Projecting today’s values onto yesterday’s Court is 
understandable—our judgments reflect the normative assumptions of 
our time, just as the Justices’ judgments in Plessy, Buck and 
Korematsu reflected theirs—but it is hardly realistic or fair. If Booker 
T. Washington could not see the injustice of de jure segregation in the 
1890s, how can we possibly expect the Justices in Plessy to have done 
so? If Helen Keller could not see the depravity of forced sterilization in 
the 1920s, why would we expect the Justices to have seen it in Buck v. 
Bell? And if Earl Warren, the Japanese American Citizens League, 
and the ACLU could not see the moral bankruptcy of interning people 
based on race in World War II, what makes us think the Justices in 
Korematsu would have had that clarity? Hindsight is twenty-twenty, 
but when the Supreme Court decides cases, it does not have the 
luxury of that view. 
The point has purchase not only for considering The Case 
Against the Supreme Court, but also for constitutional theory more 
broadly. Scholars have long lamented the disconnect between 
constitutional theory and practice, with political scientists particularly 
discouraged by the legal academy’s failure to produce normative 
theories based on a realistic conception of judicial review.240 At the 
 
 239.  Id. at 294; see also id. at 60 (“Supreme Court justices—and all federal judges—are 
given life tenure and protection from any decrease in salary precisely so they can be more 
independent and stand up to majoritarian pressures.”); id. at 89 (“[J]ustices have life tenure so 
they can be immune from political pressures, to enforce the limits of the Constitution.”); id. at 
308 (“Judicial independence means that a judge should feel free to decide cases according to his 
or her view of the law and not in response to popular pressure.”). 
 240.  See, e.g., Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the 
True Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 GEO. L.J. 897, 903 (2005) (“[A]n accurate descriptive 
account of how our interpretive system functions has been all too absent from constitutional 
theory.”); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 
7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 71 (1993) (“Theories of judicial review in a democracy will be of only 
limited interest until they correctly describe the circumstances in which judicial policymaking 
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heart of that failure is a lack of appreciation of the cultural 
parameters within which the Supreme Court actually operates. The 
Supreme Court is no oracle. It cannot step outside its historical 
context to do what a Court at a later time might do. The tendency to 
view Supreme Court decisions ahistorically—to overlook the social, 
political, and ideological context in which the decisions were made—
gives rise to a distorted sense of the Court’s countermajoritarian 
capacity, skewing our conception of judicial review.241 
Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu are powerful illustrations of the 
point. Chemerinsky claims that the Supreme Court in each of these 
cases could have, and should have, done better, but only an ahistoric 
understanding of these cases supports that conclusion. In reality, the 
historical context in which each case was decided made it hard to 
imagine the Justices ruling the other way. This is not to deny that the 
Supreme Court has, at times, protected vulnerable minorities from 
majoritarian overreaching—but its most famous feats in that regard 
have involved majoritarian overreaching at the local level.242 When the 
problem is not a pocket of oppression but rather society itself, the 
same values that permeate the rest of the population are highly likely 
to color the Justices’ views, limiting what the Supreme Court can 
realistically do. 
This is not to say that historical context always, or even often, 
plays a determinative role in the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking. 
Sometimes it does, a point I have endeavored to make with the case 
studies of Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu. But what is true of those cases 
may not be true of others. Historical context can constrain the 
Justices’ proclivity to protect and thereby limit what the Supreme 
Court can realistically do, but within the realm of realistic 
 
normally takes place.”); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative 
Action, Sodomy, and Supreme Court Politics, 23 LAW & INEQ. 1, 93 (2005) (“[L]egal theorists have 
neglected to utilize the rich analysis of public institutions that social scientists have produced. 
This omission limits the relevance of legal theory.”); Terri Peretti, The Virtues of “Value Clarity” 
in Constitutional Decisionmaking, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1079, 1081 (1994) (arguing that current 
constitutional theory “rest[s] on a fundamental misunderstanding of how American politics 
actually operates”); Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Theory and the Faces of Power, in THE 
JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN 
DIFFICULTY, AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 163–64 (2005) (“Constitutional 
theory . . . has ignored important aspects of how constitutionalism works in practice. The 
countermajoritarian framework is adequate neither for understanding how constitutional 
government works, nor for evaluating the exercise of judicial review.”).  
 241.  See Klarman, supra note 23, at 31 (“So long as we approach constitutional issues 
ahistorically, we will continue to exaggerate the countermajoritarian capacity of judicial 
review.”). 
 242.  See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (invalidating de jure school 
segregation). 
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possibilities, a number of other factors influencing the Justices’ 
decisionmaking are also in play. 
Like law. In the case studies, I have noted the law when it 
appeared to exercise influence. In Plessy, for example, the law strongly 
supported the Justices’ ruling. And in Buck, the collusive nature of the 
litigation produced weak constitutional claims, which impacted the 
legal context in which the Justices experienced the case. In 
Korematsu, by contrast, the law was not a prominent part of the story 
I told because it was capacious enough to accommodate a ruling either 
way (and indeed, the Justices’ efforts to squeeze the facts of 
Korematsu into the doctrine of Hirabayashi provide a nice illustration 
of the point). That said, it is worth noting that not one of these 
Supreme Court “failures” was obviously wrong on the law. As Jamal 
Greene has observed, anticanonical cases are not anticanonical 
because of their legal analysis; they are anticanonical because they 
have rhetorical purchase in representing value judgments that we 
strongly reject today.243 
The Justices’ views about the role of the judiciary and 
institutional values like federalism and separation of powers also play 
a part in the mix. Chemerinsky may view the Supreme Court’s raison 
d'être as the protection of vulnerable minorities, but the Justices may 
beg to differ and those differences matter. Institutional values like 
federalism and separation of powers likewise may cut against 
recognizing rights claims. Again, Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu are 
instructive.244 But as I have discussed elsewhere, these sorts of 
considerations tend to be porous enough to be a conduit of culture of 
their own.245 Where culture cuts against protection, the Justices are 
likely to be all the more wary about the prospect of overstepping their 
judicial bounds; and where culture cuts in its favor, the Justices are 
likely to be all the more convinced that protection in such 
circumstances is exactly what the judiciary is for.246 
 
 243.  See Greene, supra note 11, at 380–85.  
 244.  In Plessy and Buck, the police powers doctrine reflected an extremely limited 
conception of the judiciary’s role vis-à-vis the legislature, and in Korematsu, the judiciary’s 
limited role vis-à-vis the war-making branches of government during war drove the analysis in 
the case. In addition, various Justices, like Justice Frankfurter in Korematsu and Justice Holmes 
in Buck, were strong advocates of judicial restraint, which impacted their views (and votes) in a 
variety of doctrinal settings.  
 245.  See Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 76–77 (2007). 
 246.  For an excellent illustration of the point, see Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of 
Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48 (2000) (discussing the role of extralegal context 
in the Supreme Court’s early criminal procedure decisions, which abandoned a century and a 
half of nonintervention in state criminal procedure based on federalism concerns).  
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And then there is ideology. Chemerinsky spends a substantial 
amount of time on the Justices’ ideological preferences in The Case 
Against the Supreme Court, and for good reason. Empirical research 
has shown that as the number of “GOP Justices” rises, the Supreme 
Court’s support for rights claims falls—even in the face of supportive 
public opinion.247 For those who, like Chemerinsky, want the Court to 
support rights claims, such findings provide cause for concern. A 2009 
study showed that four of the five most conservative Justices on the 
Supreme Court since 1937 were sitting on the Court at that time: 
Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.248 Justice Ginsburg, the current 
Court’s most liberal Justice, barely made the liberal top 10.249 To the 
extent the Supreme Court is a conservative Court, ideology will 
likewise limit the Court’s proclivity to protect. 
But appointing Supreme Court Justices who are more receptive 
to rights claims is no panacea. As Chemerinsky recognizes, Korematsu 
was written by Justice Black, “a great civil libertarian,” and was 
supported by Justice Douglas, “one of the most liberal justices in 
American history.”250 Likewise, Buck v. Bell was written by none other 
than Oliver Wendell Holmes, “one of the patron saints of modern civil 
liberties.”251 The problem in these cases is not that the Justices were 
unreceptive to rights claims. The problem is that their progressive 
views were constrained by the tenor of repressive times. 
All this is to say that historical context is just one influence on 
the Justices’ decisionmaking; many others are also in play. And those 
can cut in favor of protection or against it—or even both ways, with 
some considerations going one way and others going another. 
Historical context places intrinsic limits on the Supreme Court’s 
protective proclivities, and that limits what the Court can realistically 
do—but within those limits, a number of considerations will factor 
into how the Court actually rules in any given case.  
 
 247.  See Thomas R. Marshall & Joseph Ignagni, Supreme Court and Public Support for 
Rights Claims, 78 JUDICATURE 146, 149–51 (1994) (presenting findings of empirical study).  
 248.  See Adam Liptak, To Nudge, Shift or Shove the Supreme Court Left, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
31, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/01/weekinreview/01liptak.html?_r=0 [https://perma 
.cc/TS4K-T5Y6] (discussing the study). The study does not reflect Justice Scalia’s death on 
February 13, 2016. 
 249.  See id. (“But Justice Ginsburg, whom the study identifies as the most liberal current 
[J]ustice, barely makes the Top 10 in the full tally.”).   
 250.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 56. 
 251.  See supra note 73 (discussing Holmes). 
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B. Three Ways that Culture Can Constrain the Supreme Court’s  
Proclivity to Protect 
Thus far, I have argued that historical context matters by 
considering its importance at the macro level.  In this Section, I make 
the point in more granular fashion by considering its importance at 
the micro level, examining how the constraint of culture actually 
manifests itself. Here again, Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu are 
instructive, illustrating three ways that culture can constrain the 
Justices’ proclivity to protect.  
First, culture creates an outer boundary of normative 
possibilities in any given case, at least for the Supreme Court as a 
whole. Steven Winter comes close to articulating the point in 
recognizing that “judges cannot even think without implicating the 
dominant normative assumptions that shape their society.”252 Their 
normative judgments are embedded in a larger cultural construct, and 
the parameters of that construct have implications for the realm of 
realistic possibilities in any given case at any given moment in time. 
As Lawrence Friedman explains: 
In some ways, people are like animals born and raised in zoos; they are not aware that 
their world of cages and enclosures is highly artificial, that their range of behavior is 
limited by conditions they did not create for themselves. . . . This is true for legal 
behavior as much as for any other form of behavior.253 
Culture itself sets limits on the plausible constitutional outcomes that 
a majority of the Justices might find agreeable. Those limits are 
somewhat capacious and very much subconscious, but they are real. 
Plessy v. Ferguson is a nice illustration of the point. In 1896, 
the egalitarianism embodied in Brown v. Board of Education was 
simply not within the Supreme Court’s culturally defined realm of 
possibilities, Justice Harlan’s dissent notwithstanding. In any society, 
there will be some with seemingly radical views. The question is what 
was realistically possible for the Court as a whole given the context I 
have reconstructed, and the egalitarianism of an era fifty years later 
is simply not on that list. 
Second, culture can constrain the Justices’ proclivity to protect 
through the gravitational pull of public opinion. Supreme Court 
Justices are members of society, and as such, are naturally influenced 
 
 252.  Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. 
L. REV. 1881, 1925 (1991).   
 253.  Lawrence M. Friedman, Coming of Age: Law and Society Enters an Exclusive Club, 1 
ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 1, 10 (2005).  
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by the same events that shape the rest of the public’s views. As Chief 
Justice Rehnquist explained thirty years ago: 
The judges of any court of last resort, such as the Supreme Court of the United States, 
work in an insulated atmosphere in their courthouse where they sit on the bench 
hearing oral arguments or sit in their chambers writing opinions. But these same judges 
go home at night and read the newspapers or watch the evening news. . . . Judges, so 
long as they are relatively normal human beings, can no more escape being influenced 
by public opinion in the long run than can people working at other jobs.254 
Echoing the point, Justice Douglas wrote, “The Court is not isolated 
from life. Its members are very much a part of the community and 
know the fears, anxieties, cravings and wishes of their neighbors.”255 
Whether the Justices’ views are shaped by what others think, or by 
the underlying events that shape what others think, the result is the 
same. In the aggregate, the Justices are unlikely to stray far from 
dominant public opinion because they are members of the public 
too.256 
Buck v. Bell is the quintessential illustration of the point. It is 
striking how popular eugenics was in the first two decades of the 
twentieth century. The feel of the historical record is that everyone 
who was anyone supported it (and everyone else too). In that sort of 
atmosphere, it is almost unfathomable that the Justices would have 
invalidated eugenic sterilization—not because they lacked the courage 
or might, but because it is hard to imagine them not being part of the 
dominant view. 
Third, strong gusts of public passion can constrain the 
Supreme Court’s proclivity to protect. The trauma of a major event 
like Pearl Harbor or 9/11 creates an urgency, a quickening of public 
opinion with little discussion and even less dissent. The threat of 
imminent invasion is perhaps the best example, but any highly salient 
event that grips the nation with fear or ignites public passion will 
create the sort of high-stakes scenario that typically leads the Court to 
 
 254.  William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
751, 768 (1986).   
 255.  Justices Douglas continued, stating, “That does not mean that community attitudes are 
necessarily translated by mysterious osmosis into new judicial doctrine. It does mean that the 
state of public opinion will often make the Court cautious when it should be bold.” YAMAMOTO ET 
AL., supra note 148, at 164 (quoting Justice Douglas). 
 256.  This is less true on an individual basis. When considered individually, empirical 
research has shown that the Supreme Court’s moderate, swing Justices are substantially more 
responsive to public opinion than those at the ideological extremes, although on a more or less 
ideologically balanced Supreme Court, even an effect on one of the Justices may be enough to 
render the Court responsive as a whole. See William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public 
Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic 
Perspective, 58 J. POL. 169, 189–93 (1996) (presenting empirical data). 
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defer rather than protect.257 In such scenarios, the Justices are no less 
susceptible to the intensity of the moment than anyone else, so this is 
just as one might expect.258 
Korematsu is the classic case to illustrate the point. Looking 
back at the historical context in which it was decided, Justice Douglas 
later wrote: 
Our Navy was sunk at Pearl Harbor and no one knew where the Japanese fleet was. We 
were advised on oral argument that if the Japanese landed troops on our west coast, 
nothing could stop them west of the Rockies. The military judgment was that, to aid in 
the prospective defense of the west coast, the enclaves of Americans of Japanese 
ancestry should be moved inland . . . The decisions were extreme and went to the verge 
of wartime power; and they have been severely criticized. It is, however, easy in 
retrospect to denounce what was done, as there actually was no attempted Japanese 
invasion of our country. . . . But those making plans for defense of the nation had no 
such knowledge and were planning for the worst.259 
Again, the problem was not that Justice Douglas was insensitive to 
civil liberties claims. It was that the sensibilities he brought to the 
bench were constrained by a particularly urgent, salient event. It is 
hard to imagine the Supreme Court opposing the military, president, 
Congress, and the American public in the throes of war. As Mike 
Klarman has recognized, “No court in American history has been that 
countermajoritarian.”260 
Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu illustrate three ways that culture 
can constrain the Justices’ proclivity to protect, but this is not meant 
to suggest that they provide a complete list. Noticeably absent from 
the discussion has been the constraint that the Justices experience 
when they worry about the repercussions of their rulings—concerns 
about enforcement, the Supreme Court’s legitimacy, and the 
possibility of retaliation are prime examples. As I have discussed 
elsewhere, culture impacts these sorts of concerns too, exacerbating 
them when the context is hostile to rights claims and ameliorating 
them when it is supportive.261 But as Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu 
show, culture typically limits what the Justices want to do before it 
 
 257.  For an insightful discussion of the Supreme Court’s tendency to defer to the political 
branches in “high stakes” cases, see Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth 
Constitutional Decision Making, 98 IOWA L. REV. 465, 515–17 (2013). To some extent, all three 
cases illustrate a variation of this dynamic. In Plessy, the driver was a spike in race-related 
violence against African Americans. In Buck, it was fear that the country would be swamped 
with incompetence. And in Korematsu, it was the fear of imminent invasion. 
 258.  See supra note 13 (quoting Benjamin Cardozo’s observation that “[t]he great tides and 
currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by.”) 
 259.  DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 339 n.20 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 260.  Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to 
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1933 (1995). 
 261.  See Lain, supra note 245, at 74. 
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limits what they can.262 Society is not monolithic, but where its 
currents are particularly strong (as was true in all three cases), they 
will impact the Justices’ thinking just like they impact everyone else. 
Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu illustrate three different manifestations 
of the implicit constraint that culture imposes, but other 
manifestations and more conscious, explicit forms of constraint are 
possibilities too. 
C. A Story of Supreme Court Success 
Thus far, I have argued that historical context can constrain 
the Justices’ proclivity to protect, limiting what the Supreme Court 
can reasonably be expected to do. I have also suggested that within 
the rhetoric of failure lies a story of Supreme Court success. Here is 
the gist: the rhetoric of failure that marks cases like Plessy, Buck, and 
Korematsu assumes that the Supreme Court can and should play a 
heroic, countermajoritarian role. But that role is neither obvious nor 
predetermined; we think the Court should play it primarily because 
the Court has told us this is true. With the Court as author of the very 
expectations by which it is judged a failure, the fact of Chemerinsky’s 
disappointment in the Court is itself evidence of a larger narrative’s 
success. And the point is more than academic. However historically 
inaccurate, the Court’s self-ascribed role as a countermajoritarian 
hero has had practical consequences too, setting in motion forces that 
can, over time, actually ease the Court’s cultural constraints and 
inspire its protection.  
To examine the claim more closely, consider first the central 
premise upon which Chemerinsky’s Case Against the Supreme Court is 
based. Chemerinsky confidently claims that “the two preeminent 
purposes of the Court are to protect the rights of minorities who 
cannot rely on the political process and to uphold the Constitution in 
the face of repressive desires of political majorities.”263 In making this 
claim, Chemerinsky is not alone. Over the past fifty years, the 
protection of minority rights from majoritarian overreaching has 
emerged as a primary—perhaps the primary—justification for judicial 
 
 262.  See Robert G. McCloskey, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 209 (2d ed. 1994) (“We 
might come closer to the truth if we said that the judges have often agreed with the main current 
of public sentiment because they were themselves part of that current, and not because they 
feared to disagree with it.”). 
 263.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 298. 
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review.264 But where does one get this view of the Supreme Court’s 
role? What is the basis for that claim? 
Not the Constitution itself—at least not without a much 
thicker account of constitutionalism than what its text provides. 
Constitutional text imposes limits on democratic governance, but 
enforcing those limits does not invariably lead to a heroic, 
countermajoritarian conception of judicial review. As Mike Klarman 
has shown, the Constitution supports at least ten theories of 
constitutionalism, each with a corresponding justification for judicial 
review.265 Protection of minority rights is one of those theories, but it 
is one conception of the Court’s role among many. To argue that the 
Constitution itself establishes the Supreme Court’s preeminent 
purpose as being the protection of vulnerable minorities is a difficult 
claim to make; if not for the Supreme Court incorporating the Bill of 
Rights protections to the states, not even those protections would be a 
prominent part of the Court’s enforcement role.266 
One might respond by noting that the Framers were concerned 
with the protection of minority rights, and that much is true.267 Yet 
even this recognition does not provide an anchor for Chemerinsky’s 
claim. The minority rights that the Framers were mostly concerned 
about—that of property owners, merchants, slave holders, and the 
like268—are not the kind that Chemerinsky has in mind. Indeed, the 
 
 264.  See Marshall & Ignagni, supra note 247, at 151 (“By far, the most commonly cited 
argument for this [Supreme Court] institution is that it helps protect controversial or unpopular 
minorities’ civil liberties and rights.”). In 2008, Rebecca Zietlow did a Lexis search for law 
reviews written in the previous twenty years that advocated the position that the Supreme Court 
should protect minorities against the will of the majority, finding over 500 articles. See Rebecca 
E. Zietlow, The Judicial Restraint of the Warren Court (and Why it Matters), 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 
255, 259 n.13 (2008). For a sampling of these works, see, e.g., Michael J. Perry, Protecting 
Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the Courts?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635 (2003); 
Jeremy Waldron, A Rights-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 18 
(1993). 
 265.  See generally Michael J. Klarman, What’s So Great About Constitutionalsim? 93 NW. U. 
L. REV. 145 (1998) (articulating ten leading accounts of constitutionalism).  
 266.  At the very least, this is true in the criminal context, where over ninety-five percent of 
all cases are tried at the state level. If the protections of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments had not been incorporated to the states, they would scarcely matter at all. 
 267.  For example, Madison argued of a need to “protect the people against the transient 
impressions into which they themselves might be led” due to “fickleness and passion” or “sudden 
impulses . . . to commit injustice on the minority.” JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 193–94 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1996). 
 268.  See id. at 77: 
Debtors have defrauded their creditors. The landed interest has borne hard on the 
mercantile interest. The Holders of one species of property have thrown a 
disproportion of taxes on the holders of another species. The lesson we are to draw 
from the whole is that where a majority are united by a common sentiment, and have 
an opportunity, the rights of the minor party become insecure. 
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Supreme Court’s protection of the minority rights of property holders 
in cases like Dred Scott and Lochner forms a substantial part of 
Chemerinsky’s complaint.269 
Maybe the answer is nothing but need. As Barry Friedman has 
observed, we have a “need to imagine a countermajoritarian court, 
even if one d[oes] not exist.”270 This is what Mike Klarman calls the 
“psychological imperative” of a heroic, countermajoritarian Supreme 
Court,271 and Chemerinsky illustrates it beautifully when he asks, “If 
not the Court, then who will protect our most basic liberties and 
prevent people from suffering greatly from their infringements?”272 
Somebody has to be there to protect us from ourselves.273  If not the 
Supreme Court, who? 
I don’t pretend to have an answer to this question; maybe we 
do view the Supreme Court as playing a heroic, countermajoritarian 
role in part because we need to—but there is a better origin story yet, 
and its author is the Supreme Court itself. Why do we believe that the 
Supreme Court can protect vulnerable minorities and check the 
desires of repressive majorities? Because the Court has told us it is 
true. 
The story starts in 1937.274 The “switch in time that saved 
nine” had ended the Lochner era; the Supreme Court capitulated on 
economic regulation, presuming its validity under the newly embraced 
 
(emphasis added); see also KERMIT HALL, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND JUDICIAL POWER IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 283 (2013) (“[T]he framers viewed unchecked popular government as a threat to 
the rights of minorities, especially property owners, merchants, investors, and slaveholders.”); 
Klarman, supra note 265, at 162 (“For much of its history, the Court protected the minority 
group for which the Framers entertained the greatest sympathy—property owners.”).    
 269.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 21–29 (discussing Dred Scott decision), 90–119 
(discussing Lochner era decisions). 
 270.  Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 161 (2002).  
 271.  See Klarman, supra note 23, at 23–24 (recognizing point).  
 272.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 60. 
 273.  See Sherry, supra note 10, at 1 (“Too much of a good thing can be bad, and democracy is 
no exception.”). 
 274.  This is not to deny that the Supreme Court recognized rights claims before then, 
although the cases typically cited for the point rested more on the protection of property rights 
and economic opportunity than on the protection of vulnerable minorities per se. See, e.g., Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (“Plaintiff in error taught in school as part of his 
occupation. His right thus to teach and the right of the parent to engage him so to instruct their 
children, we think, are within the liberty of the Amendment.”); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“[Plaintiffs] have business and property for which they claim protection. 
These are threatened with destruction through the unwarranted compulsion which appellants 
are exercising over present and prospective patrons of their schools. And this court has gone very 
far to protect against loss threatened by such action.”). 
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rational basis test.275 But that gave the Court an identity crisis as it 
struggled to find a sphere to reassert the legitimacy of judicial 
review.276 The result was history’s most famous footnote—Carolene 
Products’ footnote four—wherein the Court suggested that “more 
searching judicial inquiry” may be appropriate where legislation 
infringed on fundamental rights, interfered with the function of the 
political process, or concerned “discrete and insular minorities.”277 The 
constitutional revolution of 1937 had brought a constitutional 
revelation in 1938, and with it, the seeds of a heroic, 
countermajoritarian conception of judicial review. 
And so it began. With a reference to “tyrannical governments” 
and World War II clearly on its mind, the Supreme Court in 1940 
would claim that “courts stand against any winds that blow as havens 
of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because they are 
helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming 
victims of prejudice and public excitement.”278 And in 1943, it followed 
with the claim that “the very purpose of a bill of rights was to 
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political 
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials 
and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the 
courts.”279 Never mind that footnote four was just an idea the Court 
was floating, a thought it hoped would spawn discussion and an 
agreeable realm for judicial review down the road.280 And never mind 
 
 275.  See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (upholding 
constitutionality of minimum wage legislation, ending the Lochner era). 
 276.  See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 714 (1985) 
(discussing Supreme Court’s need to reassert its independence and reestablish the legitimacy of 
judicial review after capitulating on economic regulation); Kurt Lash, The Constitutional 
Convention of 1937: The Original Meaning of the New Jurisprudential Deal, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 
459, 462 (“From the perspective of the Supreme Court, the New Deal Revolution was not about 
embracing Rooseveltian Progressivism, it was about reestablishing the legitimacy of judicial 
review in the modern world.”). 
 277.  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938); see also CARL 
BRENT SWISHER, THE SUPREME COURT IN MODERN ROLE 175 (1958) (recognizing that the role of 
the Supreme Court to protect civil liberties had “its formal start in a footnote to a case decided in 
1938”).  
 278.  Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236, 241 (1940). 
 279.  West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
 280.  As an exposé by Justice Stone’s law clerk at the time explained:  
The Footnote was being offered not as a settled theorem of government or Court-
approved standard of judicial review, but as a starting point for debate—in the spirit 
of inquiry, the spirit of the Enlightenment. . . . The modest hope was that the Footnote 
would catalyze thoroughgoing analysis and discussion by bar, bench, and academe, 
and that a complete and well-rounded doctrine would eventuate. 
Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1098–
99 (1982).  
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that in the early years, these proclamations were more talk than 
action.281 The Supreme Court said it was its role to play the 
countermajoritarian hero, and we have taken that as true. 
But our conception of the Supreme Court in this regard is 
based not only on the Court’s assertions. Chemerinsky’s chapter 
entitled “What About the Warren Court?” is a nod to the rest of the 
story.282 The Warren Court is “the paradigmatic example of courts 
protecting the rights of minorities,” Rebecca Zietlow observes, “a 
heroic icon for an entire generation of lawyers and academics, and 
many of their subsequent students.”283 By conventional wisdom, the 
Warren Court played the heroic, countermajoritarian role time and 
time again. And if the Warren Court could do it, so the argument goes, 
the Supreme Court can do it at other times too. 
Two observations about the Warren Court’s role in this story 
merit mention. First, the popular conception of the Supreme Court as 
a staunch protector of minority rights is, as Zietlow notes, “a relatively 
recent phenomenon”—before the mid-1950s and 1960s, the Court was 
better known for denying rights claims than granting them.284 Second, 
and more fundamentally, not even the Warren Court actually 
exemplifies the heroic, countermajoritarian ideal for which it is 
famous. The Court did protect minority rights, but its protection was a 
reflection of, and response to, larger sociopolitical change.285 That said, 
neither of these points negates the fact that the Warren Court brought 
a tectonic shift in the Court’s persona. Internalizing the language from 
an earlier era, the Warren Court forged a new image of judicial 
review. 
And it stuck. In footnote four and related flourishes, in the 
Warren Court, even in Korematsu—the Court created an image, an 
 
 281.  See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding flag salute statute 
against claim of religious liberty for Jehovah’s witnesses); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214 (1944) (upholding removal of Japanese citizens from homes during World War II); see also 
Lusky, supra note 280, at 1103 (noting that it was seventeen years after Carolene Products 
before the Supreme Court actually accepted its premise); Friedman, supra note 270, at 177 (“The 
range of liberties cases was not vast, however, largely because most of the rights in the Bill of 
Rights still were not applied against the states.”).   
 282.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 120; see also id. at 13 (“I applaud the Warren Court and 
in many ways see it as a model for what the Court can be.”). 
 283.  Zietlow, supra note 264, at 255, 270.   
 284.  See id. at 262.   
 285.  See generally L.A. SCOT POWE, THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000); 
Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in 
the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 1361 (2004); see also Mark Graber, 
Constitutional Politics and Constitutional Theory: A Misunderstood and Neglected Relationship, 
27 LAW AND SOC. INEQ. 309, 313 (2002) (lamenting the fact that the legal academy has “analyzed 
Warren Court decisions as if Barry Goldwater had won the 1964 national election.”).  
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expectation, a standard by which it would be judged. And that brings 
me back to The Case Against the Supreme Court. 
Chemerinsky is disappointed in the Supreme Court for not 
fulfilling its role as protector of vulnerable minorities. But that role is 
not inherent in the Court’s composition; it did not spring forth from 
the Constitution fully formed. It did not have to be, but it is, and it is 
because the Court created it. One answer to Chemerinsky, then, is 
that the Supreme Court may not live up to its heroic, 
countermajoritarian role, but that role would not exist but for the 
Court in the first place—and the very fact of Chemerinsky’s 
disappointment is a reflection of how successful that role creation has 
been. 
If the story ended there, the point would be purely academic—
an interesting aside about the irony in Chemerinsky’s disappointment 
with the Supreme Court. But the story does not end there. As it turns 
out, the expectations that the Court has created have had 
repercussions of their own. 
One such repercussion is on the Supreme Court itself. The 
Court’s self-conception of its role as a countermajoritarian protector 
has helped it stretch to its countermajoritarian limits, at least in 
certain contexts. Here, several of the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment cases come to mind; its protection of flag burning, cross 
burning, and Klu Klux Klan rallies as freedom of expression are prime 
examples.286 The conduct is extremely unpopular, and so one might 
think given the discussion thus far that the Justices would have little 
to no inclination to protect it. But the just opposite is true. The Court 
protects, and the public accepts—perhaps even supports—that 
protection in part because both the Justices and the public believe 
that protecting unpopular speech is what the Supreme Court is 
supposed to do.287 As Chemerinsky has recognized elsewhere, role 
recognition can have significant behavioral effects on the Supreme 
Court.288 The free speech context is one example. Although much work 
still needs to be done on why the Justices embrace their 
countermajoritarian role in some contexts and not others, one can at 
 
 286.  See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (protecting cross burning as free 
speech); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (protecting a KKK rally as free speech); Texas 
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (protecting flag burning as free speech). 
 287.  See Or Bassok and Yoav Dotan, Solving the Countermajoritarian Difficulty? 11 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 13, 24 (2013) (“Yet we argue that the public and its representatives want a Court that 
is willing to exercise its judicial review authority in a [countermajoritarian] fashion.”). 
 288.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 
CALIF. L. REV. 1013, 1024 (2004) (recognizing point and noting that “[h]ow judicial review is 
discussed by scholars today will influence how it is practiced tomorrow.”). 
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least say this: the conception of the Court as a countermajoritarian 
protector gives it more room and inclination to play that role than if 
that conception did not exist. 
What I have just discussed is essentially bootstrapping—the  
Supreme Court’s self-conception as a countermajoritarian protector 
creating the room and inclination to actually play it out—but equally, 
if not more significant has been the impact of the Court’s role on 
others. In creating expectations, the Court created a cadre of believers, 
social activists who have faith in the Court’s ability to play a heroic, 
countermajoritarian role. Chemerinsky is one of them. And believers 
do not stop believing when the Court lets them down, they do not stop 
litigating just because they lose. They search and search until they 
find the winning narratives, which change the framing of the issues, 
which creates empathy for outsiders, which starts conversations, 
which brings attention to an issue, which builds momentum for 
change. And over time, when there is enough momentum for change, 
those boundaries imperceptibly, but surely, move. In short, the 
Justices cannot transcend their cultural constraints, but the 
expectations the Court has created can do something better—they can 
set in motion the very forces that can, over time, ease those 
constraints and inspire the Court’s protection. 
Even our disappointment in the Supreme Court for failing to 
live up to our expectations plays an important part in this process. 
What do we do as a result of that disappointment? We talk about it. 
We blog about it. We write op-eds and law review articles about it. 
And if we get mad enough, and are knowledgeable and dedicated 
enough, we even write books about it.289 And those start conversations 
of their own (like this one). 
This is not to say that the story I have told is a bed of roses; no 
interesting story ever is.  Frustration mounts when the Supreme 
Court fails to meet our expectations time and again, eroding the 
Court’s support.290 And the closer the Court comes to actually playing 
a heroic, countermajoritarian role, the more it risks triggering a 
 
 289.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1.  
 290.  Chemerinsky’s book is a testament to the frustration of the faithful, and arguably the 
Supreme Court’s low public approval ratings are a reflection of this phenomenon as well. See 
Justin McCarthy, Disapproval of Supreme Court Edges to New High, GALLUP (Oct. 2, 2015), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/185972/disapproval-supreme-court-edges-new-high.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/7PJP-MBS9] (reporting the results of a 2015 Gallup poll showing that 50% of 
respondents disapproved of the job the Supreme Court was doing, while 45% approved, and 
noting that the disapproval rating was a new high). 
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backlash that will hurt the very cause it is trying to help.291  
Moreover, the Court’s robust recognition of rights claims can cut for, 
and against, the liberal agenda—again, the free speech context is 
instructive.292 And last but not least, none of what I have discussed 
can take back the decades of suffering from the legal sanction of 
racism under ‘separate but equal,’ or the thousands who were forcibly 
sterilized in the wake of Buck v. Bell, or the Supreme Court’s approval 
of over 100,000 Japanese Americans ripped from their homes during 
World War II.  
But this story and its consequences do present a curious upside 
to the ahistoric view of the Supreme Court that results in decisions 
like Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu being portrayed as failures, rather 
than regrettable mistakes reflective of regrettable times. The Supreme 
Court cannot live up to Chemerinsky’s expectations.  But in numerous 
ways, the fact that he even has those expectations is itself stunning 
evidence of a vastly underappreciated, and decidedly consequential, 
story of Supreme Court success. 
CONCLUSION 
Prolific author and respected civil rights litigator Erwin 
Chemerinsky has high expectations of the Supreme Court and is 
understandably disappointed by decisions like Plessy, Buck, and 
Korematsu.  But his disappointment reflects an ahistoric view of what 
the Supreme Court can realistically do. This is not to say that viewing 
the Court ahistorically is all bad. However historically inaccurate, the 
Supreme Court’s image as a countermajoritarian savior ready and 
able to transcend its cultural constraints has set in motion forces that 
can, over time, ease those constraints and inspire the Court’s 
protection. Given the Justices’ inherent limitations, that is no small 
measure of success. 
 
 
 291.  The paradigmatic example is Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), which 
invalidated the death penalty as it was then administered. See Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 
supra note 15. 
 292.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that 
the First Amendment protects the speech of corporations and that campaign contributions 
constitute a constitutionally protected form of free speech). 
